

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Bulletin

Vol. XXXIX, No. 1011

November 10, 1958

UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF CHINA RE-AFFIRM SOLIDARITY • <i>Joint Communiqué and Statement by Secretary Dulles</i>	721
SECRETARY DULLES DISCUSSES U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR BRITISH TELEVISION BROADCAST • <i>Transcript of Interview With William D. Clark</i>	733
THE BASES OF PEACE • <i>Remarks by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy</i>	740
THE UNITED NATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY • <i>by William I. Cargo</i>	725
PROBLEMS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE • <i>Statement by Under Secretary Dillon</i>	742
U.N. COMMITTEE OPENS DEBATE ON DISARMAMENT • <i>Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and James W. Barco</i>	747

THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XXXIX, No. 1011 • PUBLICATION 6724

November 10, 1958

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:
\$2 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25
Single copy, 25 cents

The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 20, 1958).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT
OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated.

*The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.*

*Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.*

United States and Republic of China Reaffirm Solidarity

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Press release 634 dated October 23

The following is the full text of the communique issued at the conclusion of the meetings between President Chiang Kai-shek and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Taipei, October 23, 1958.

Consultations have been taking place over the past three days between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of China pursuant to Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty.¹ These consultations had been invited by President Chiang Kai-shek. The following are among those who took part in the consultations:

For the Republic of China:

President Chiang Kai-shek
Vice President-Premier Chen Cheng
Secretary General to the President Chang Chun
Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Shao-ku
Ambassador to the United States George K. C. Yeh

For the United States of America:

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson
Ambassador to the Republic of China Everett F. Drumright

The consultations had been arranged to be held during the two weeks when the Chinese Communists had declared they would cease fire upon Quemoy. It had been hoped that, under these circumstances, primary consideration could have been given to measures which would have contributed to stabilizing an actual situation of non-militancy. However, on the eve of the consultations, the Chinese Communists, in violation of their declaration, resumed artillery fire against the Quemoy. It was recognized that under the present conditions the defense of the Quemoy,

together with the Matsus, is closely related to the defense of Taiwan and Penghu.

The two Governments recalled that their Mutual Defense Treaty had had the purpose of manifesting their unity "so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area." The consultations provided a fresh occasion for demonstrating that unity.

The two Governments reaffirmed their solidarity in the face of the new Chinese Communist aggression now manifesting itself in the bombardment of the Quemoy. This aggression and the accompanying Chinese Communist propaganda have not divided them, as the Communists have hoped. On the contrary, it has drawn them closer together. They believe that by unitedly opposing aggression they serve not only themselves but the cause of peace. As President Eisenhower said on September 11,² the position of opposing aggression by force is the only position consistent with the peace of the world.

The two Governments took note of the fact that the Chinese Communists, with the backing of the Soviet Union, avowedly seek to conquer Taiwan, to eliminate Free China and to expel the United States from the Western Pacific generally, compelling the United States to abandon its collective security arrangements with free countries of that area. This policy cannot possibly succeed. It is hoped and believed that the Communists, faced by the proven unity, resolution and strength of the Governments of the United States and the Republic of China, will not put their policy to the test of general war and that they will abandon the military steps which they have already taken to initiate their futile and dangerous policy.

In addition to dealing with the current military situation, the two Governments considered

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 13, 1954, p. 899.

² Ibid., Sept. 29, 1958, p. 481.

Chinese Communist Resumption of Firing in Taiwan Straits Area

Statement by Secretary Dulles¹

I am informed that the Chinese Communists have resumed sporadic firing in the Taiwan (Formosa) Straits area. I am nevertheless continuing my trip to Taipei. I had embarked on what I believed and hoped was a mission of peace. I shall persist in that purpose.

One week ago the Chinese Communists announced that they would suspend their attacks for at least 2 weeks more. It seemed to President Chiang Kai-shek and President Eisenhower that under those circumstances it would be useful for me to go to Taiwan for consultations. It is obvious that if the Communists resume their fighting to achieve their political goals our consultations cannot have the same scope and character that would have been possible if there were a cease-fire. Nevertheless, I believe that consultations can usefully be held.

It is a tragedy that the Chinese Communists have again displayed their warlike disposition. All who love peace must hope that the present resumption of fighting will be of short duration and that the world may be spared the grave consequences of Communist persistence in aggression.

¹Made at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, on Oct. 20 (press release 629).

the broad and long-range aspects of their relationship.

The United States, its Government and its people, have an abiding faith in the Chinese people and profound respect for the great contribution which they have made and will continue to make to a civilization that respects and honors the individual and his family life. The United States recognizes that the Republic of China is the authentic spokesman for Free China and of the hopes and aspirations entertained by the great mass of the Chinese people.

The Government of the Republic of China declared its purpose to be a worthy representative of the Chinese people and to strive to preserve those qualities and characteristics which have enabled the Chinese to contribute so much of benefit to humanity.

The two Governments reaffirmed their dedication to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. They recalled that the treaty under which they are acting is defensive in character. The Government of the Republic of China con-

siders that the restoration of freedom to its people on the mainland is its sacred mission. It believes that the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people and that the principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three people's principles (nationalism, democracy and social well-being) and not the use of force.

The consultations which took place permitted a thorough study and reexamination of the pressing problems of mutual concern. As such they have proved to be of great value to both Governments. It is believed that such consultations should continue to be held at appropriate intervals.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

White House press release dated October 24

I returned last night from 3 days in Taipei, Formosa. There we held consultations with the Government of the Republic of China pursuant to our Treaty of Mutual Defense. These consultations had been planned to occur during the period when the Chinese Communists had said they would not carry out their bombardments from the mainland. However, while we were en route to Formosa, the Chinese Communists resumed firing on Quemoy in violation of their cease-fire pledge.

It is possible that the firing is more for psychological than for military purposes. Apparently the Communists desire to throw roadblocks in the way of stabilized tranquillity. Last night the Chinese Communist official press agency boasted that "the United States has met with defeat in her original plot to use the Chinese temporary suspension of shelling Quemoy to promote a permanent cease-fire." The Communists seem to believe that they can best achieve domination of the western Pacific if they perpetuate confusion and uncertainty and if they alternatively give hopes for peace and fears of war. They accompany their erratic action with intensive propaganda to the effect that, if the people of Asia would unite to expel the United States from the western Pacific, then all would be well.

We return confident that the Chinese Communists will not gain their ends either through their military efforts or their propaganda guile. Free China is resolute—its Government, its armed

forces, and its people. All of the free countries of the Far East increasingly realize that Chinese communism is a mortal danger. They are heartened by the manifest power of the United States and our stand against retreat in the face of armed aggression.

The will of the free peoples of Asia to resist Chinese communism intrusions is, I judge, more solid than ever before.

While at Taipei I was again made aware, at first hand, that the dominant spirit within the Republic of China is not mere military defense but rather that of peacefully bringing freedom to all China. The Government realizes its responsibilities as the authentic custodian and defender of those honored cultural and spiritual values long identified with China. It believes that its mission is to bring about the restoration of freedom to the people on the mainland and to do so, not by the use of force but by conduct and example which will sustain the minds and hearts of the mainland Chinese so that they are unconquerable.

I return convinced that the Government of Free China is prudent, resolute, and dedicated to the peaceful achievement of its high mission as spokesman for the aspirations and traditions of China. The American nation can be thankful that there exists a Free China animated by these sentiments. It resists those forces whose central purpose is world rule and, to that end, the encirclement and ultimate defeat of the United States.

Negotiations for the Suspension of Nuclear Weapons Tests

Following are the texts of a statement by President Eisenhower and an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union on negotiations for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests, together with a list of the members of the U.S. delegation.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

White House press release dated October 25

On August 22, 1958, the United States declared its willingness, in order to facilitate negotiations for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and establishment of an international control system,

to withhold testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of 1 year from the beginning of these negotiations on October 31. The sole condition for this voluntary 1-year suspension is that the Soviet Union should not itself conduct tests during this period.

The United Kingdom has similarly declared its willingness to suspend tests. It thus lies with the Soviet Union to decide whether on October 31st all countries which have tested nuclear weapons will have voluntarily suspended testing.

The United States regrets that the Soviet Union has not accepted the offer of the United States and the United Kingdom, although we still hope that it will do so.

U.S. NOTE OF OCTOBER 20¹

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to note 58/OSA of October 1, 1958, regarding arrangements for the meeting on suspension of nuclear tests and establishment of an international control system scheduled to begin in Geneva among the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. on October 31.²

The United States takes note of the Soviet statement that the aim of the conference would be the conclusion of an agreement to cease tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons by all states forever, and the establishment of appropriate control over the implementation of such an agreement. It is the sincere hope of the United States that the conference will make sufficient progress to justify the expectation that the final termination of all nuclear weapons test explosions may in due course be achieved. The United States has always accepted as a most desirable objective the final termination of nuclear weapons test explosions. However, the United States feels it necessary to refer once again to the terms of the statement of the President of the United States of August 22, 1958.³ In this statement, President Eisenhower declared that the United States would be prepared

¹ Delivered on Oct. 20 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (press release 630).

² For a previous exchange of notes, see BULLETIN of Sept. 29, 1958, p. 503.

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378.

to refrain from nuclear weapons tests for further successive periods of one year after the initial suspension of one year, provided that the Soviet Union would do the same, that the agreed inspection system is installed and working effectively, and that satisfactory progress is being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantive arms control measures. If sufficient progress can be made at the Geneva conference which is to open on the 31st of October and if subsequently these objectives are effectively achieved without undue delays, the world could then be confident that nuclear weapons testing would never be resumed by the parties to the agreement.

The United States considers that an agreement for the suspension of nuclear weapons testing under international control should be worked out as rapidly as possible. In view of the complexities of detecting and verifying violations of an agreement on suspension of nuclear tests which are revealed in the report of the Geneva Conference of Experts,⁴ careful and detailed negotiations will be required for an agreement of such importance, however, and the United States considers that this work should be initiated on October 31 at the diplomatic level. If, as the discussions at the diplomatic level proceed, the presence of Foreign Ministers seems necessary and desirable, the Secretary of State would be prepared to attend.

SOVIET NOTE OF OCTOBER 1

Unofficial translation

No. 58/OSA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and in connection with Embassy note No. 262 of 10 September has the honor upon instructions of the Soviet Government to state the following.

Account is taken of the positive reply of the Government of the United States concerning the proposal of the Government of the Soviet Union that negotiations on the cessation of tests of nuclear weapons, by all powers having such weapons at their disposal, should be conducted in Geneva. Thus the question about the date of the start of the talks, 31 October this year, and the place of their conduct can be considered agreed upon.

As for the task of the coming meeting, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to confirm its position set forth in the Ministry's note of 30 August,⁵ and specifically that the aim of such a meeting is the conclusion

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 453.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1958, p. 503.

of an agreement on the cessation forever of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons by states with the establishment of appropriate control for the fulfillment of such an agreement.

At present when it has been confirmed by the Geneva meeting of experts that any testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons cannot remain unnoticed, there should not be any obstacles in order that the powers possessing nuclear weapons should conclude an agreement on the immediate cessation of tests of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons everlastingly.

Taking into account that the immediate and universal cessation of tests of nuclear weapons is an urgent problem, involving the vital interests of all mankind, the Soviet Government hopes that the participants of the meeting will apply all efforts in order in the briefest period possible to reach and sign the appropriate agreement. Having this in mind, the Soviet Government proposes that the meeting should be called on the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, USA, and Great Britain.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the USA will attentively study these proposals of the Soviet Government and give a positive answer to them.

MEMBERS OF U.S. DELEGATION

Press release 643 dated October 25

The State Department on October 25 announced the members of the U.S. delegation to the conference on suspension of nuclear tests, to be held at Geneva beginning October 31, 1958:

U.S. Representative

James J. Wadsworth, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, U.S. Representative on Disarmament

Deputy U.S. Representative

Robert F. Bacher, member, President's Science Advisory Committee

Senior Advisers

Charles C. Stelle, Department of State

Alfonzo P. Fox, Lt. Gen., USA (retired), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

George M. Kavanaugh, Atomic Energy Commission

Congressional Advisers

Albert Gore, United States Senate

(Hubert H. Humphrey, United States Senate, alternate)
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, United States Senate

Advisers

Vincent Baker, Department of State

Robert G. Baraz, Department of State

Stephen Benedict, U.S. Information Agency

Hans A. Bethe, member, President's Science Advisory Committee

Darcy Brent, Department of State

Harold Brown, Atomic Energy Commission

Charles E. Collett, Col., USAF, Department of Defense
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Office of the Special Assistant to
the President for Science and Technology
Richard Latter, Rand Corporation
Doyle L. Northrup, Department of Defense
David H. Popper, American Consulate General, Geneva
Luther Reid, Department of State

Malcolm Toon, Department of State
Paul Toussaint, Department of State
Henry S. Villard, American Consul General, Geneva
John N. Washburn, Department of State
Secretary of Delegation
Virgil L. Moore, American Consulate General, Geneva.

The United Nations and National Security

by William I. Cargo
Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs¹

The problem of our national security in the world of today is of direct personal concern to every American. It is a potent truism that war with modern weapons would weigh heavily on civilian populations. Our citizens throughout the country, particularly in urban areas, would face the threat of destruction of life and property. In broader terms the question of our national security is the question of our right and ability to develop American life and institutions for the well-being of present and future generations.

It is most appropriate also to relate American security to the role of the United Nations. The United Nations is now well into its second decade. At this same point in history the American people face a threat to their security greater than ever before. We may well inquire, therefore: What is the role of the United Nations in promoting the peace and security of the world and, accordingly, our own security?

In dealing with this question, I propose first to comment on the nature of the security position in which the United States now finds itself. Against this background I will then discuss the role of the United Nations in relation to our national security.

American Security in a Changing World

The security position of the United States has been sharply affected by developments since World War II. There was a long period in our

history when this country, flanked by two great oceans, was nearly invulnerable. This, unhappily, is no longer the case. What has brought about this tremendous change?

First of all, there is the enormous destructive power of modern weapons. Notwithstanding all of the publicity about nuclear and thermonuclear explosions there is a real lag in our thinking about them. Perhaps we tend to think in terms of World War II. Perhaps the human mind recoils at the terrible destructiveness of these new weapons. Yet these weapons of tremendous power exist; they are possessed not only by the United States and the United Kingdom but also by the Soviet Union; and other countries are striving to develop them. These facts are of major importance in appraising the present security position of the United States.

Another factor of first magnitude in our changed strategic position is the reduction of the built-in safety factor which the United States has historically enjoyed. Our classical strategic position is that we have been geographically isolated from those who might threaten our security. We have been endowed with an abundance of natural and human resources which could, in good time, be converted to military strength. Should a threat to our security emerge, as in the case of the growth of ambitious military power in Europe or military action against our bases in the Pacific, we could rely upon our basic position of strength to permit us months and even years to develop the military power to turn back the threat to our security. Our national security could thus be based on the presumption that the permissible re-

¹ Address made before the Rochester Citizens Committee for United Nations Day at Rochester, N. Y., on Oct. 24.

action time between threat and response could be relatively long.

This pattern has been radically changed by modern technology. High-speed military aircraft can already span the oceans or the polar wastes in a matter of hours. Faster aircraft are constantly being developed. And as we progress into the missile era we must reckon with the fact that weapons of massive destructive power could approach our great cities at thousands of miles per hour and arrive within minutes of the time launched. Thus our permissible reaction time may now need to be measured in hours or in minutes rather than in months or years. The era of our history when we could build up our military strength *after* a threat to our survival had been launched is gone, probably forever. And gone with it are concepts of security which are no longer adequate to meet our requirements in this changed world.

The Soviet Challenge

In considering our current security position we should recall that there was a time when many tended to cite our large population, our seemingly ample resources, our scientific and technological skills, and our enormous industrial capacity as the answer to all existing or prospective problems. While no one would deny that our strength is great and the capacities of our country and its people enormous, I think we now see these things in somewhat more realistic perspective. We recognize that, populous as this country is, we represent only about one-twentieth of the population of the world. The Soviet and Chinese Communists control nearly one-third. We recognize that our resources, great as they are, are not unlimited. We are by no means self-sufficient. We know, in fact, that we import substantial quantities of some 50 commodities of fundamental economic and strategic importance. We also realize that we do not have a monopoly on scientific achievement or technical know-how. We have not failed, for example, to realize the contribution of scientists from friendly European countries to the development of the nuclear sciences and the first atomic weapons. We have had impressed upon us by visible signs in the night skies the achievements of Soviet scientists.

These developments which I have noted affecting the United States security position in the

world are largely a reflection of scientific and technological developments. These have made a deep imprint upon our traditional strategic position and have greatly compounded our security problem. These developments would be in themselves highly significant. But we have also had, following World War II, a concentration of power in two main centers. To appreciate the problem fully in its present magnitude, we must assess the Soviet challenge to our security.

The Soviet Union, as the leader of world communism, is a country whose rulers are dedicated to the proposition that communism will inevitably be adopted throughout the world. They are dedicated to the achievement of this objective, however long it may take and irrespective of possible tactical deviations. Khrushchev has made this clear in his frank comment: "We will bury you."

Now this objective of Soviet communism, incompatible as it is with American security interests, would not necessarily be in itself a matter of serious proportions. The seriousness of the Soviet threat to United States security arises precisely because this objective of world domination is held by those who also control a political, industrial, and military system of great and increasing power.

What is the basis of this enhanced power position of the Soviet Union?

First of all, there is the rapid growth of Soviet economic capacity. The Soviet Union in its four decades of existence, and at incredible cost in human terms, has developed an industrial base second only to that of the United States. The Soviet gross national product is increasing by more than 5 percent per year—a rapid rate, indeed—and is expected to reach nearly \$350 billion by 1965. During the past decade the Soviet output of electrical power and oil has nearly quadrupled. Soviet steel production has shown a similar rate of growth. There are many other graphic illustrations of the rapidly expanding Soviet economy. And the Soviet Union has just this week announced that its new 7-year plan will call for the achievement by 1965 of production goals for steel, electric power, coal, and oil originally set for 1972.

We are sharply aware also of the increased Soviet scientific and technical capacity. The Soviet Union has developed its capabilities in the atomic field and devised nuclear and thermonuclear

weapons at a rate which many people in the West did not consider possible. The advanced state of Soviet technical capabilities has also been apparent in their development of long-range ballistic missiles and in the launching of earth satellites. The very term "sputnik" has entered the international vocabulary, an achievement no doubt relished by Soviet propagandists.

Closely related to the growing scientific and technical capacity of the Soviet Union is the role of Soviet education. The Soviet Union systematically molds its educational system and regiments its students to serve the objectives of the Soviet Communist Party and the state. Heavy emphasis is placed on scientific training and its practical application in industrial engineering and technology. The vigor with which the Soviet educational program has been pursued should be carefully noted in this country. In 1914 only some 10,700 "specialists" graduated from secondary and higher special educational institutions in Russia. In 1955 such graduates totaled 1,634,000.

The Soviet educational system is also designed to fit the pattern of Soviet world objectives in its emphasis on languages. Every high school student in the Soviet Union must study a foreign language for 6 years. If he goes on to university work, he must learn one of the languages of Asia or Africa, a significant point in itself. Some 8,000 American students are studying Russian; 10 million Soviet students are studying English.

Here then is Soviet education: It is geared in a massive way to the development of the industrial and military power of the Soviet Union and to the world objectives of Soviet leaders.

Soviet scientific, technological, and industrial achievements have been directed toward the building of a powerful military machine. Since the end of World War II the Soviet Union has reequipped massive ground forces, built fleets of modern jet aircraft and submarines, and developed stockpiles of nuclear weapons and missiles. This direct translation by the Soviet Union of scientific and industrial potential into military power is a salient factor in the world security situation.

Implications for United States Security

In this brief way I have sought to indicate what seem to me to be certain of the principal features of America's security position in the world to-

United Nations Day, 1958

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*

U.S./U.N. press release 3027

As the United Nations reaches its 13th birthday it is proper for us to reflect on what the United Nations means to the United States.

Americans want a foreign policy which does two things—promotes world peace and upholds our national interests and ideals.

The United Nations is a place where we pursue that foreign policy. In it we work together with like-minded nations, not only to solve disputes but also promote positive things like the atoms-for-peace program, worldwide malaria control, and better living standards for people all over the world. We seek by persuasion and diplomacy to increase the number of our friends and decrease the number of our opponents.

The United Nations also serves as a great loudspeaker which can expose Communist fallacies and mobilize world public opinion against aggressors. It is the most effective single engine in the world for the influencing of world opinion.

The world today is a dangerous place. The United Nations is not going to take us to heaven. But it has already done much—in Korea, the Middle East, and elsewhere—to prevent wars, punish aggressors, and make the world a more decent place in which to live.

It is up to the member nations, including particularly the United States, to make the United Nations work. On this anniversary, therefore, we should remember how much an effective U.N. adds to the peace and safety of the American people.

day. Modern technological developments and the growth of an aggressive power system under the control of the Soviet Union pose for us serious challenges which we can ignore only at our peril.

There are, in my view, some rather clear implications in the situation which I have outlined. I would summarize these as follows:

1. The thought of war, with the colossal destructiveness which it might now bring—far exceeding anything else in human experience—is repugnant to most Americans. But security for this country cannot be found in recoiling from grim facts. We cannot allow the Soviet rulers the freedom to take the world at their leisure.

2. We cannot—and do not—rest our security on the *potential* military strength residing in our great industrial capacity and our reservoir of scientific achievement and technical skills. The

United States and its free-world allies must have adequate military forces ready at all times. This concept of "force in being" is, for example, the basis of the formation of our Strategic Air Command. It is fundamental also to the organization and purposes of that great defensive alliance of free nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The concept of adequate "force in being" is, in short, the essential basis of the ability of the free world to deter those who might contemplate aggression.

3. We must recognize, as indeed I think we all do, the long-term character of the Soviet challenge to the security of the free world. We are not dealing with some transient political system that might be changed or obliterated by a "palace revolution." We must therefore place our reliance not in the presumed or hoped-for weakness of others but in our own strength, deeply rooted in the physical power and moral fiber of our people and properly adjusted to meet the challenges of our age.

4. "Go-it-alone-ism" is not a feasible policy for the United States. Despite our considerable resources it is clear that our national defense requires the maintenance of strong collective-security arrangements with other free nations. We depend upon our friends and allies for vital raw materials, for manpower and equipment to oppose Communist aggression, for access to bases and facilities essential to our capacity to deter aggression, and for significant contributions in science and technology. Free Europe contains the world's largest industrial complex outside the United States. With this European industrial establishment, the free world has a substantial preponderance of productive capacity over the Communist world. Were this great industrial plant of free Europe to fall into Communist hands, the productive capacity of the Soviet Union would be more than doubled. The serious implications of such an eventuality for American security are self-evident. For comparable reasons we need our other friends and allies of the free world in the quest for mutual security just as they need us.

5. Security is indivisible. It is indivisible in a geographic sense. An act of aggression cannot be ignored simply because it may seem to be far away. A threat to the independence and integrity of a state is no less serious because the intended victim may be small. The teaching of history in

this matter is precise. Freedom everywhere has paid the price when free men have stood aside and watched aggression triumph in areas which they conceived to be not of direct concern to them.

Security is also indivisible in the sense that the battle for security in the world today must be fought on many fronts. It must be fought in political, psychological, economic, and social areas even more continuously than in purely military terms. The era of the A-bomb and the H-bomb is likewise the era of indirect aggression, of subversive efforts to destroy independent states. We have become well acquainted with the technique of so-called "volunteers" who somehow turn up in areas of tension. The battle for security today is also a struggle for the minds of men—and for their stomachs as well. Our own security is thus increasingly bound up with political, economic, and social conditions in allied and friendly countries and with the advancement of dependent peoples toward self-government or independence. We must therefore see American security today in broad perspective. It is notable that the United Nations operates on a similar broad basis.

Meeting the Challenge

In the light of this developing world situation, our Government and the American people have engaged in a broad program of action.

- The United States has built up its own defense establishment to insure against the dangers of surprise attack. The Strategic Air Command, maintained in a high state of readiness, provides the backbone of our strong deterrent against aggression. Our recent achievements with nuclear submarines are further evidence of the constant labor of science, industry, and government to insure the primacy of our modern weapons systems.

- We have pursued vigorously the mutual security program designed to assist friendly nations and allies in building up their economic strength and to maintain forces essential for their own defense and the defense of the free world.

- Through collective-security arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, we have developed regional collective-security systems welding the free world together and standing as barriers to possible aggression.

- We have developed a program of countering Soviet propaganda, making it possible for

others to hear the truth about this country and world problems. I refer to the programs of the United States Information Agency, particularly the broadcasts of the Voice of America. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, the United States Representative to the United Nations, challenged the Soviet Union to permit the peoples under its control to hear without obstruction the broadcasts of the full proceedings of the recent emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly on the Near East. The Soviet Union sought to jam these broadcasts, once again illustrating their extreme sensitivity to efforts to provide the truth to people behind the Iron Curtain.

* We have strongly supported the United Nations as a force for international peace and security and in its program to advance human well-being. This is a key element in the conduct of our foreign policy.

The Role of the United Nations

I have dealt with the challenges of world change to our national security and the measures we have taken to meet them. I would now like to turn to the question with which we began, namely, what can the United Nations do to promote international peace and security and accordingly that of the United States?

The overall answer to this question is, I think, clear: A strong and effective United Nations contributes to international peace, security, and stability, and consequently it also enhances the security and strength of the United States. To the extent that the United Nations is successful in its efforts to stop or prevent aggression and to find peaceful adjustments in disputes which might otherwise lead to war, the interests of the United States and United States security are advanced. To the extent that the United Nations contributes to economic and social well-being, it contributes to stability and expands the area of security around us. In my judgment the record shows that the United Nations has been both responsive to American interests and a force for peace in the world.

The United Nations and Collective Security

Now let us look at some of the specifics. First of all, the United Nations as an instrument of collective security:

It would be a mistake to seek to assess the U.N. in purely military terms. We should recall here, however, the role played by the United Nations in repelling Communist aggression in Korea. Forces from some 17 countries gathered under the U.N. symbol and, for the first time in history, an international organization took successful action to counter aggression. The circumstances surrounding the U.N. role on the Korean question were, however, somewhat unusual. For example, the Security Council was able to act effectively because the Soviet Union was absent and therefore did not interpose the veto.

We must realistically recognize the basic differences of view which exist between the Soviet Union and the United States sharply limit the ability of the U.N. to carry out the collective-security role envisaged in the U.N. Charter. In this situation the United States places its primary reliance for collective security on regional arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These regional defense arrangements are within the framework of the charter and support its broad objectives of maintaining international peace and security.

I would add this: The United Nations has the necessary flexibility to facilitate the establishment of a broader collective-security system whenever the fundamental attitudes and policies of governments will make this possible of achievement.

Disarmament

No question dealt with by the United Nations is of greater potential significance to our national security than the question of disarmament. The destructive power of modern weapons and the development of newer and more effective means of launching surprise attacks make it clear that our security would be enhanced if we could achieve a limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces under effective safeguards and controls that would insure that the agreed terms would be observed by all sides.

The crux of the disarmament problem seems to me to be whether agreement *can* be reached on the necessary controls and safeguards. Concretely, this means that there should be sufficient international control and inspection to insure that all disarmament measures agreed upon will in fact be faithfully carried out by *all* the governments concerned. A disarmament agreement cannot be a mere paper agreement. In clear terms: we must

be assured that it will be carried out by the Soviet Union. Otherwise, our security would be diminished rather than enhanced.

Now it is precisely this question of safeguards and controls which the Soviet Union is likely to find the most difficult. The Soviets, with their emphasis on secrecy, will be clearly reluctant to open their territory to the required international inspection.

Some encouraging developments in the disarmament picture have taken place, however, in recent months. A conference of experts in Geneva, including both American and Soviet personnel, reached agreement on the technical requirements for a workable system to detect and identify nuclear explosions.² Further discussions are scheduled to begin in Geneva on October 31 to seek agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of a control system for monitoring a suspension.³ We will discover in this conference whether the Soviet Union is actually prepared to agree to establish the required inspection system and to provide the necessary facilities for it to function effectively within the Soviet Union.

Beginning on November 10 a conference of experts, also including both American and Soviet personnel, will convene in Geneva to explore the practical aspects of guarding against surprise attack.⁴

The United Nations has had, and will continue to have, an important role to play in the search for meaningful disarmament. The United Nations has provided an opportunity for all members to contribute their ideas on disarmament. It has facilitated actual negotiations by establishing bodies such as the Disarmament Subcommittee, through which extensive negotiations were carried out in London between the Soviet Union and Western states. The United Nations, by resolutions it has adopted, has recognized the importance of balanced measures of disarmament under appropriate safeguards. The United Nations might well provide the framework within which a control and inspection system might be established under the provisions of any disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union.

²For background and text of the final report, see BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1958, p. 452.

³See p. 723.

⁴BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1958, p. 648.

Disarmament is being discussed at this very time in the General Assembly of the United Nations.⁵ It is our hope that the Assembly by its discussions will assist in maintaining the forward momentum we have gained in the disarmament field.

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

In addition to seeking appropriate agreed controls for nuclear weapons in disarmament negotiations, the United States has taken the lead in promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In 1953 President Eisenhower, in his "Atoms for Peace" speech, called for the establishment of an international agency for this purpose. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has now been established with headquarters in Vienna. Among its tasks, it will promote the application of radioisotopes to agriculture, medicine, and industry; facilitate the exchange and training of experts and technicians in the nuclear sciences; serve as a channel for exchange of information resulting from research; and undertake studies and surveys to encourage the development of atomic power.

The Agency is also designed to assist in establishing safeguards to prevent the diversion of fissionable materials to weapons purposes. It is in the interest of our own security to encourage the IAEA in this task so that we may be assured that exports of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes do not breed military dangers.

Outer Space

Although little is known about the nature of outer space, recent developments have made it clear that the potential uses of this new frontier for peaceful or destructive purposes are enormous. The United States has proposed technical discussions with the Soviet Union to see whether a system of control can be established that will insure that outer space will be used only for peaceful purposes.⁶ Although the Soviet response has not yet been favorable, we hope that the Geneva talks on nuclear weapons testing and the projected technical discussions on surprise attack will lead to similar discussions on outer space.

The United States supports international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. The

⁵See p. 747.

⁶BULLETIN of Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

United States has proposed that the present General Assembly of the United Nations establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the peaceful uses of outer space to survey the problem and consider what the U.N. might appropriately do in this field. A program of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space was undertaken during the International Geophysical Year under the International Council of Scientific Unions. This cooperative endeavor of scientists, including scientists of the Soviet Union, is to be continued. We hope this will set a constructive precedent for the future.

Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes

One of the major purposes of the United Nations is to bring about by peaceful means the adjustment or settlement of international disputes which might lead to a breach of the peace. It is clearly of the highest importance to settle differences between members of the world community before they become accentuated, possibly resulting in armed conflict. This is not to suggest that disputes which reach the United Nations are likely to be small. In many cases they are serious indeed.

The record of the United Nations as a force for averting war by settling differences through peaceful means is an outstanding one. It is well to recall some of the major achievements of the U.N. over the 13 years of its life thus far. By its actions the United Nations:

- Focused world opinion on the Soviet refusal to withdraw its forces from Iran and played a major role in the withdrawal of these troops in 1946.

- Helped bring an end to Communist intervention in Greece, which was threatening the integrity and independence of that state.

- Assisted in halting the fighting in Palestine and in implementing the Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighboring Arab states.

- Brought about a truce between India and Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute and offered a forum in which this question could be discussed with a view to peaceful adjustment.

- Brought about a settlement of the future status of the former Italian colonies, a difficult question resulting from World War II.

- Avoided a major war in the Suez crisis by

bringing the pressure of world opinion to bear for a quick end to hostilities.

- Supervised the clearance of the Suez Canal and assisted in reopening it to the commerce of the world.

- Established a United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon in view of the external threats to the independence of that country.

- Worked out, through the Secretary-General, arrangements to assist in preserving the independence and integrity of Jordan.

This incomplete list graphically illustrates the breadth of United Nations activities to preserve the peace.

The United Nations has in fact developed as the greatest single center the world has known for harmonizing the actions of nations. Quite apart from the formal agenda of United Nations meetings, we can never know the scope of the informal conversations which take place in the corridors and lounges of the United Nations. I have never walked through the Delegates Lounge of the United Nations when the General Assembly is in session without being sharply aware of this great gathering of leaders from all over the world and the many opportunities this affords for useful discussions of mutual problems. At the current session of the General Assembly, for example, some 65 foreign ministers and prime ministers have been in attendance.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Hammarskjold, by his quiet and effective efforts has come to play a major role in the peaceful settlement activities of the United Nations. He is increasingly called on by the General Assembly and the Security Council to undertake tasks of composing differences between members. In his position as Secretary-General he commands the respect of the entire membership of the United Nations. The efforts of the Secretary-General and his associates, particularly Dr. Ralph Bunche, have been notably effective in the troubled area of the Near East.

In its efforts to preserve the peace and to prevent small incidents from becoming major ones, the United Nations has developed a flexible technique of employing military personnel in observation or patrol work. Many of these groups are now widely known by their initials: UNEF, the United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez area; UNTSO, the United Nations Truce Super-

vision Organization in the Palestine area; and UNOGIL, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. Beyond the value of their specific duties, it has become apparent that the interests of peace are well served by the symbol which such groups provide of a "United Nations presence" in a troubled area. This in itself is testimony to the stature which the United Nations has achieved not only here but in distant places throughout the world.

The experience of UNEF and the other groups I have referred to has been found to be so useful that there is wide opinion in the United Nations that steps should be taken looking toward some kind of a standby United Nations force. The U.N. Secretariat, for example, might develop plans for calling into being and supporting such a force in implementation of a United Nations decision to employ it. The United States supports such a concept. The General Assembly at its current session will consider this question.

Economic and Social Progress

The United Nations is broadly engaged in promoting economic and social advancement and the betterment of conditions of life of peoples throughout the world. Through the United Nations General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the specialized agencies, the United Nations is making steady progress in combating disease, poverty, ignorance, and hunger. This work is done quietly; it does not usually result in newspaper headlines.

The United Nations has economic commissions for Latin America, the Far East, and Europe and a newly created Economic Commission for Africa. There are funds for technical assistance to underdeveloped areas and a new Special Projects Fund is now being created by the General Assembly.⁷ There are programs for refugees and emergency funds for children. There are broad programs for health, programs for education and training, and scholarship activities of many kinds.

Here are three specific examples of the work of the United Nations in this important area, important not only in terms of human values but also in terms of world peace and U.S. security:

1. The World Health Organization is engaged in a campaign, with every prospect of success, to

eliminate malaria from the face of the earth—malaria which strikes 200 million persons annually, of whom 2 million die and countless others are permanently afflicted.

2. The Food and Agriculture Organization has taught the Indonesian techniques of growing edible fish in rice paddies to farmers elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and even in the Caribbean. This has resulted in greatly supplementing existing food supplies and in providing a better diet by adding new and valuable sources of protein.

3. The United Nations Children's Fund now helps more than 50 million children and mothers each year to better health. For many millions of these, it has granted life in place of death.

I need not dwell upon the obvious relationship of the economic and social activities of the United Nations to our own security interests. People who are imbued with the sense of hope, the eagerness for tomorrow, which economic and social well-being can give, do not respond to the propaganda appeals of Soviet communism. When the United Nations helps people increase their food supplies, reduce sickness, learn productive crafts and trades, it is taking constructive actions for peace—and we should lend it our continued support in such actions.

Conclusion

In order to safeguard our national security in the world of today, we must be acutely conscious of the difficulties we face and we must work as individuals and as a people to meet them. We must continue to build our strength on the national level. We must continue to work with allied and friendly countries in establishing the conditions for mutual and collective security. And we must continue to give strong support to the United Nations. This I am sure we will do. As President Eisenhower has said in his United Nations Day proclamation:

. . . firm support of the United Nations has always been a fundamental element of our foreign policy.

The United States has a vital and direct concern in the success of the United Nations. The efforts of the United Nations to avert or repel aggression, to settle disputes among nations by peaceful means, to promote economic and social advancement and otherwise to eliminate the causes of international friction are consistent with United States objectives and promote our security interests.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Nov. 3, 1958, p. 702.

The United Nations is not a substitute for American policy. As we face the world's problems, we cannot step back and leave them to the United Nations. The United Nations is strong when its members give it strength. As we look to the fu-

ture, we must be prepared to work through the United Nations with vigor, imagination, and leadership. We should thus move forward with the United Nations in its continual quest for peace and justice in the world.

Secretary Dulles Discusses U.S. Foreign Policy for British Television Broadcast

Following is the transcript of an interview recorded at Washington on October 17 between Secretary Dulles and William D. Clark and broadcast on October 23 over the Independent Television Network of the United Kingdom.

Press release 635 dated October 23

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, I am extremely grateful to you for finding time to come and answer the sort of questions that are bubbling up in Britain. As you know, there has been a good deal of criticism of American policy and perhaps some misunderstanding. I wonder if you would care to reply to what is probably the commonest form of their criticism, which is that America is missing opportunities for improving peace or the chances of peace by your being too rigid?

Secretary Dulles: I am delighted, Mr. Clark, to have the opportunity to talk with you and through you to our friends in Britain about these aspects of our foreign policy. On this question of rigidity, I do believe that there are certain basic principles in which we believe and to which we must hold steadfastly. We are up against a creed which believes almost fanatically in a different concept of the nature of the world, the kind of a civilization we should have, and above all the nature of man and the part man plays in it. It should be just a mechanistic particle to be dealt with by government in the interests of material welfare.

We have a totally different concept, always have had; and this struggle of man for freedom has been going on over the centuries, and we cannot conduct it successfully unless we believe in it and are steadfast and strong for it. Now, in those basic things I admit to being rigid, to standing firm and standing solid.

Now, as to the mechanics with which you carry

things out, your day-to-day tactics, I do not think the charge of rigidity can be made against me. Indeed, over here oftentimes I am accused not of being rigid and consistent but of being inconsistent. So I think when it comes down to the details, the tactics, there is room for flexibility. I try to show it. But on the basic principles I do believe in standing strong and steadfast, and I think without that we will never survive the assault to which our civilization is being subjected.

Nature of Struggle With Communism

Q. Do you then see the struggle with communism as primarily a moral or primarily a power political struggle?

A. Primarily a moral struggle. Because, if it was only power politics and did not involve a basic threat to the whole moral values of our civilization, we wouldn't treat it as a worldwide struggle. The question of which regime exercises power here and there is of itself unimportant in many parts of the world, as far as we are concerned. It is only because that power is becoming a challenge to the basic moral principles of our Judeo-Christian civilization, and indeed the civilization which is based upon other great religions—it is only because of that that it becomes a worldwide struggle and a struggle where we must all stand together.

As Mr. Spaak said the other day, speaking here in Boston,¹ we must come to recognize that the struggle is a struggle against our civilization being conducted all over the world, and unless the free nations meet it everywhere we will be defeated.

Q. Then do you foresee in the reasonably near future any possibility that there will be some sort

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1958, p. 607.

of a possibility of peaceful coexistence perhaps reached through the disarmament talks?

A. Well, I think that it's possible perhaps to improve the armament situation. That is one of these, what I call, tactical situations where there is no reason why there should not be flexibility. To my mind, the most important aspect there is the possibility of developing these areas where there is protection against surprise attack. It's when people live under the menace of almost instant annihilation that they become nervous, somewhat jittery, where they concentrate themselves upon building up defensive weapons, deterrent weapons. Here today we go to meetings of the National Security Council, as I went this week, and are told that we probably will not get more than 15 minutes' warning before practically our entire country will be obliterated.

Now, when you face that kind of a threat, you have to build up counterthreats, deterrents, and so the thing goes on mounting, mounting, mounting. And I do not see the likelihood of a formula for a disarmament which can work unless you strike at the heart, the root of the trouble, which is the fear of massive surprise attack. And I place the greatest hope upon the possibility of developing zones of strategic importance in critical parts of the world where you could develop areas where the likelihood of surprise attack would be substantially diminished. We tried to do that, you know, in the Arctic zone, and the Soviets complained about flights in the Arctic area, but we said, "Let's set up a zone so neither of us will be afraid." Everybody thought that would be a wonderful idea, except the Soviet Union, and they vetoed it when it came to the Security Council.² But I still have hope. And you know we are planning to have talks with the Soviets about that subject I hope in November.³

Q. Then the thing that one wonders is what will be the end of all this. When one has got perhaps some slight lessening of tension as the result of a disarmament agreement of any sort, what do you look forward to then—a period of negotiations? Or do you think that communism will wither away?

A. Well, I am not sure that communism as a social and economic structure will wither away. I

do see an evolution away from what I call international communism, that is the kind of communism which tries to spread its creed all over the world, which believes that you cannot have world order, world peace, unless it controls everything and brings about a state of conformity with its principles everywhere. Now that is a form of warfare which can only be ended, in my opinion, by a change away from that policy. I don't see how we can ever capitulate to that. And it is not willing to compromise. It believes, just as strongly as we believe in our faith, that their system is the answer but it can't work until it is worldwide.

Now that will evolve, in my opinion, gradually to a system which puts more emphasis upon national welfare, the welfare of the peoples. There is no dispute at all between the United States and the peoples of Russia. If only the Government of Russia was interested in looking out for the welfare of Russia, the people of Russia, we would have a state of nontension right away. The trouble is these areas, the Sino-Soviet area, the Russians and the Chinese Communists, are not working for the benefit of their own people. They are working to spread throughout the world a creed which is irreconcilable with our own.

You take China. Here you have got people where millions of them are starving, and what does that government do? It ships food out in order to get a political conquest somewhere else. At my staff meeting yesterday I was told that they are sending 70 technicians and \$20 million, approximately, to Yemen. Why are they doing that? Not because there isn't need for these technicians, for this money, in China, but because they think that is an opportunity to get a political conquest in Yemen. And you cannot, as I see it, have peace with that kind of a society. But I do believe that there will be an evolution of this communism, so more and more it will come to concentrate upon the welfare of its own people and will give up this fantastic dream of world conquest.

Q. Is there anything we can do to hasten that day, in which there will be an increase?

A. Yes, there is, certainly. And the thing that we can do is to make it apparent that it can't succeed. You may recall in the speech that Khrushchev made where he denounced the evils of Stalinism and the "cult of personality" and all the cruelties of that police state.

**Ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 816.
***Ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1958, p. 648.

Q. Yes, I know.

A. And in it he said he was asked, "Well, why didn't you do something about it earlier?" He said, "We couldn't do anything about it earlier because it was gaining such victories." Now, as long as it gains victories, it's not going to change, knowing it contributes to its going on more and gaining successes. If we stand stout and resolute and oppose it everywhere, whenever we can, and it doesn't gain successes, then it will almost automatically change and be more of a domestic phenomenon and less of an international phenomenon.

U.S. Policy of Nonrecognition of Communist China

Q. You have just mentioned China, and recently the danger of war seems to have been more from China than it has been in Europe. There is a lot of criticism in Britain of America's China policy and, I think, very little understanding of it. There are two main criticisms. I'll put the first one to you and ask you to say something. It is this: that we feel, many of us—not necessarily the government—that the policy of nonrecognition of the government in Peking is both unrealistic and has involved you, so to speak, in taking sides in what is virtually a dead civil war. Would you say something on that?

A. The question of recognition involves to some extent a play on words. There is no doubt we recognize Communist China as a fact, as we deal with Communist China. Indeed, I suspect that the United States has had more continuous serious dealings with Communist China than any other free-world country over the last 10 years. We have dealt with it in Korea in terms of the Korean armistice. We, with you and France and others, dealt with it at Geneva at the Indochina armistice. We have had talks at the diplomatic level, first at Geneva and now in Warsaw, over the last 4 years with the Chinese Communists. It's a fact and we deal with it as a fact, and whenever it is advantageous to the world or for peace to do business with it, we don't hesitate to do business with it.

Then there is another form of recognition which means diplomatic recognition. That carries with it very great advantages to the recognized state. It turns over assets throughout all the world to its control. It puts it in a position of prestige as regards the Chinese overseas populations which look

very largely to it for guidance. In many countries of the world if they recognize the Chinese Communists they would turn over an asset in terms of those overseas Chinese which would probably result in the subversion and overthrow of the Government.

Now we don't see any particular reason why we should give this great advantage to a regime which announces its bitter hostility to us and to all the principles upon which we stand. That isn't a policy of blindness. That is a policy of realism. As I say, we recognize it exists. We negotiate with it. We deal with it, wherever that will serve a useful purpose. But we do not give it all the surplus advantages which would flow from general diplomatic recognition, because those added advantages would merely be used against us and against all the things we believe in. So we think the practical policy of realism is to do that.

Now let me remind you that this policy of so-called nonrecognition is equally applied by the rest of us. You can take East Germany. There is a so-called People's Republic of East Germany. It's a fact, but neither your government nor ours recognizes it. Why? Because we believe it is politically disadvantageous and harmful to our interests to do it. So the guide in these things isn't something doctrinaire, that you have to give recognition of a diplomatic character to a regime which is hostile to you and where it involves great disadvantages to do it. You have a choice about that. But, on the other hand, we do not accept the blind policy of pretending that it doesn't exist. It does exist. We know it exists. It has killed and wounded about a hundred thousand Americans; so obviously it exists.

Q. I think the other part of the criticism which stems from this, though, is that, as a result of non-recognition and as a result of recognition of an alternative regime in Formosa, you became involved, not just immediately but over the years, in hostilities which are very dangerous to world peace and aren't getting us anywhere. I wonder if you could say something about the positive aspects of American policy, where it is getting us toward China?

A. Well, we have not, in fact, become involved in hostilities, except where the Chinese Communists intervened in Korea and fought us and the United Nations and you and others who had forces in the Republic of Korea. There we

fought, and we fought together, against the Chinese People's Republic and its Red forces. Otherwise we have not engaged in hostilities toward it. We have supported the Government of China which was the recognized Government of China which we all recognized before 1945, which we have continued to recognize, despite the partial results of the revolution.

But, you see, this question of its being a civil war is exactly the same as the situation in Korea, where it was claimed that that was a civil war. And the Russians and the Chinese Communists and the north Koreans took the position there that we were intervening in a civil war, that this was just an effort of the Koreans to unite themselves. The same thing in the case of Viet-Nam. But we don't believe that, in the case of civil wars of this sort, force ought to be used by either side at a point where it involves great international complications.

The Federal Republic of Germany has agreed not to use force to unite Germany. And we rejoice that it has taken that decision. The Republic of China on Formosa has agreed with us not to use force to go back to the mainland or against the mainland in any way except in joint agreement with us. The only threat comes from the Chinese Communists. They have attacked and may attack again.

Now then, the question comes, if they attack what do you do? Do you fall back, or do you retreat? We believe that the whole position of the free world in the western Pacific, running from Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines, down to Viet-Nam, Australia, and New Zealand, depends upon maintaining a strong line against the thrusts of the Chinese Communists against that insular and peninsular position of the free world, which is held with difficulty. It's a thin line. It's not a continuous line such as you have in western Europe. And it can only be held, in our opinion, if we stand firm.

We are not going to attack or tolerate attacks against the Chinese Communists, but when they attack then I think we have to stand firm. If we don't I think that there will be a breach in the line, and the effect of that will be felt all along and that whole position of the free world in the western Pacific will be lost. We will be driven back home, and indeed that is the avowed goal of the Sino-Soviet policy. They say that. "Go

back home. You belong in your own side of the Pacific and get away from the western Pacific."

Q. We tend to look at Asia not as the Pacific but from the Indian Ocean, up from India, from our traditional history. What part do you see is going to be played in Western policy in Asia by the great neutralist power of India in Asia? What part do you think the United States can play in helping India?

A. Well, I think we can play a very considerable part, and indeed we are. We have given a tremendous assistance to India. And India is neutralist in only one sense of the word. India is neutralist in the sense that it has not joined up in any of the collective-security organizations. I think they may be wrong, but I think on the whole the free nations are more apt to stay free if they unite in collective security. But each country can make that decision for itself. We don't quarrel with the Indian decision. India is not neutral in the sense that it is indifferent to the threat of communism. It is fighting it, fighting it vigorously, hard, and is attempting to demonstrate for its own people that a free way of life can improve human welfare. And in that struggle, that competition with communism, we are all for it, and we believe it is extremely important that it should succeed.

U.S. Economic Aid Programs

Q. Do you think that economic aid programs of the United States are really as important as the military alliances?

A. You know, that is one of the great troubles that we have in dealing with you gentlemen of the news media. Whenever we make a speech, you may have in it 90 percent about economic development, improvement, and so forth, and 10 percent about some military business. The thing that makes the headlines, that makes the news, is the 10 percent about the military. That always seems to attract more attention, be more newsworthy; and I have made speech after speech about the nonmilitary aspect of our foreign policy, and it never makes a headline or even a subheadline. But if you talk about the military business and retaliatory power and deterrent power and so forth, that is a screaming headline right away. So oftentimes your own views get distorted, your policies get distorted, because the human interest

attaches more to the military than the nonmilitary. I attach, myself, more importance to the nonmilitary than to the military.

Q. And do you think—incidentally, I have just been in India and come back from there—do you think that the programs that you are doing, and that we are taking some part in too, are beginning to have an effect, that, on the whole, we are stabilizing free Asia?

A. I think so. I think that this Indian second 5-year program is going to be carried through. It has had very great help from various free-world countries, most of all from the United States; considerable help from you and from others. And I believe that it will succeed, and, as I have said before, I think it is extremely important that it should succeed. Because while I attach the greatest importance to the maintenance of the spiritual values—the moral values of the free world, in terms of the right of individuals to think as they wish, to believe as they wish, to get information, and so forth—one cannot realistically expect that human values will be preserved in an atmosphere of squalor and misery. And there is a dynamic spirit—in recent years, with the development and spread of political independence, there has alongside of that developed a feeling on the part of the people that that political independence must bring them better economic and social conditions. And I think it is vitally important that there should be a response to that. I think, if there is no response to that, then the democratic institutions of these newborn countries will fade away and they will be replaced by some form of Communist or State Socialist scheme, which will, in fact, destroy human liberties in an effort in that way to achieve greater economic welfare. We have got to prove that the two things will go hand in hand: human freedom and human rights, and economic welfare.

Q. What about the Middle East? Recently the President announced a plan for economic development with American help in that area. Do you think that is going to do anything to produce stability and some protection for our interests in the Middle East?

A. I hope so very much. Of course, as the President said when he addressed the extraordinary United Nations General Assembly on the subject,⁴ the desire for it has got to be manifested

by the Arab peoples themselves. They are extremely sensitive, as all peoples are who have been in the past subjected to colonial rule and who now feel that they have gotten their independence. And they are suspicious, and they do not want to be subjected to the risk of political domination again under the guise of economic assistance. So that the plan must originate really with them.

Now what we have made clear, and I think others have made clear, is that if there is such a desire they will find a ready response. Mr. Hammarskjold, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, has been working on that general idea, and certainly there is desperate need for a greater economic welfare there. The misery, the squalor, the disease there are terrible. One can't visit those countries without being impressed by it. And I would hope very much that the Arab countries would see that their own legitimate national aspirations can be combined with a joint economic program which would stabilize the area and improve the welfare of their people.

Middle East Oil—Mutuality of Interests

Q. Do you think that will also do something to protect our interests, particularly our interests in oil in that area, or would one realize—that is of importance after all?

A. I think it will, but—if you will permit me to take exception when you say "our" interests in oil—the interests there are mutual. It is just as important and vital to the peoples of those areas to have a market for their oil as that we should be able to buy the oil. As a matter of fact, the oil is obtainable—not quite as readily or as cheaply, but it is obtainable elsewhere in the world. And the important thing to recognize, I think, when we talk about this matter is that we are providing a market which provides the resources which can tremendously help the welfare of those countries. And there is a growing development there of plans to use oil royalties and so forth for economic welfare, and that is not just a development of something that is of interest to the West. It is of interest to the West, of course, but it is equally important to have a market. A pool of oil is about the most worthless thing there is in the world unless you have the machinery for marketing it. And we provide that, and that is a joint enterprise between the West and the Arab countries.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1958, p. 337.

Q. You mentioned a moment ago the ex-colonial peoples and their feelings. I think one of the things that has divided Britain and America since 1776 has been America's great suspicion of British imperialism. Do you think the country now, America now, recognizes how much British colonialism is a thing of the past and the British Commonwealth is a thing of the future?

A. I think so. Naturally our history books still carry the memories of the distant past. But I think that there is by and large in this country a tremendous admiration for the way in which—our own country being an exception—there has been a peaceful evolution of the countries of the British Empire, what used to be the British Empire, to independence; now the British Commonwealth. And, although it is under no written constitution, one of the great facts of the world and one of the brilliant feats, I think, of statesmanship, is to have brought about that peaceful evolution so that now, whereas you had an empire with a single rule in London, you have a commonwealth of free countries all voluntarily participating and each under a government of its own choosing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if I could ask you one at least rather more personal question, which is this: You have been Secretary of State now for 6 pretty gruelling years, and you seem to be doing very well and very healthy on it. Tell me, what is it that keeps you going? Is it faith, hope, or do you somehow enjoy all the pressures and the power that go with this great post?

A. You know, I don't think anybody is a very good analyst of himself, and I have never psychoanalyzed myself; so I don't really know the answer to this. But I can say this, Mr. Clark: These are times of tremendous importance. Anybody who has a tradition, as exists in my family, of public service in the international field cannot but feel the challenge of these times. And when you have a President, such as President Eisenhower, whom I consider a very great President, one who himself knows a great deal about international affairs, problems of war and peace—if he says, "I think you are the fellow to carry this job at this time," I think one cannot but take satisfaction and do one's best to justify the faith that President Eisenhower puts in you. And I

think it is that perhaps more than anything else that keeps me going.

Role of English-Speaking Countries

Q. Then a last question arising really out of that. You say these are really very stirring times; we would all agree. What sort of a world—taking a pioneer's-eye view of the whole world—what sort of a world do you see emerging in the next quarter century or so? And, incidentally, what part do you think the English-speaking peoples, Britain and America, are going to play in that?

A. I think that we are developing into a world where there must be far greater interdependence between all nations, and "interdependence" is a phrase which was particularly emphasized when your very great Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, was here talking with President Eisenhower a year or so ago,⁵ and it is a key word—interdependence.

You cannot preserve independence nowadays without interdependence. Now who are the people who should set the first example in interdependence? Shouldn't it be our peoples who derive from the same traditions, speak the same language, have the same religion, have the same common-law principles, and so forth? If we can't do it, who can you expect to do it? And I look upon the extremely close cooperation which now exists happily between our countries as setting an example of interdependence. It is not anything which is exclusive to us. It is not an attempt on our part to set ourselves up over the rest of the world. It is setting an example which needs to be set and carried out so that all of us are cooperating more and more. But we, with certain common heritage, have certainly an example to set, and I think we are setting that example.

Q. Today, do you think that the English-speaking—that Britain and America are really cooperating well again?

A. I think I can say without fear of challenge that never since this nation became independent has there been the close cooperation that exists at the present time. And indeed I doubt whether history shows ever that two countries have been

⁵*Ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1957, p. 739.

cooperating as closely as we are cooperating at the present time. And let me emphasize again that is not an effort to set up a family of two over the rest of the world. It is setting an example of the kind of thing which we are prepared to do and want to do with other countries, but, because of certain elements in common, we perhaps can set the stage for doing this thing. But we want to have it—I know your country and our country want to develop this theme of interdependence everywhere. But surely we are setting a good example ourselves.

Q. That is a very hopeful note to end on. And thank you very much indeed, Mr. Dulles, for giving us your views in this way.

A. Well, I am delighted to have had this opportunity.

Q. Thank you.

Second Anniversary of Hungarian Revolt

Department Statement

Press release 638 dated October 23

Two years ago, on October 23, the people of Hungary rose in spontaneous revolt against a Soviet-imposed Communist regime which for many years had suppressed their liberties and subverted their national independence. Their courageous struggle to free themselves from Soviet domination and to institute a government of their own choosing evoked worldwide sympathy. Tragically, this national effort to achieve freedom did not succeed because of the ruthless intervention of the armed forces of the Soviet Union.

Since the suppression of the revolt, the present Hungarian regime has carried out systematic reprisals against those who led or participated in the uprising. Many reports of secret trials, imprisonment, and executions have reached the outside world. Their authenticity was shockingly attested in June of this year in the executions of former Premier Imre Nagy, General Pal Maleter, and two of their companions.¹

The United Nations has repeatedly called upon the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to comply

with the terms of the resolutions on Hungary which were adopted in the General Assembly by overwhelming majorities. The Soviet and Hungarian Governments have willfully refused, however, to act in accordance with these resolutions. They have also refused to cooperate in any way with the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary and with the United Nations Special Representative on the Hungarian Problem. These actions of the Soviet and Hungarian Governments in defiance of the United Nations, no less than their repressive actions within Hungary itself, have occasioned deep concern in the United States and elsewhere throughout the world. They cannot and will not be ignored.

On this second anniversary of the Hungarian revolt, the people and Government of the United States recall with profound respect the valiant struggle of the Hungarian nation. The sacrifices which the Hungarian people have made in the cause of their own freedom are indeed an inspiring contribution to the cause of freedom for all mankind.

U.S. Replies to Soviet Note on Balloons

Press release 638 dated October 23

On October 22, the American Embassy at Moscow delivered the following note to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The United States Government acknowledges the receipt of the note of the Soviet Government of October 13¹ concerning aerial balloons of American manufacture which the Soviet Government states recently landed in the Soviet Union.

The position of the United States Government regarding this matter has been set forth in a note delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 5, 1958.² In that note the United States Government pointed out that the balloons referred to by the Soviet Government might have been among those unrecovered by the Cambridge Research Center of the United States Air Force,

¹ For a Department statement of June 17, 1958, see BULLETIN of July 7, 1958, p. 7.

² Not printed.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 29, 1958, p. 504.

which had launched from the West Coast of the United States a number of high-altitude weather research balloons in connection with a program designed to gather meteorological information on the earth's atmosphere. If this proved to be the case, the Soviet Government was requested to return the scientific recording instruments attached to the balloons in order that the data collected might be evaluated and made available for use throughout the world scientific community. With this objective in mind and if these instruments are in fact among those unrecovered by the Cambridge Research Center, the United States Government renews its request that the Soviet Government return this equipment through the American Embassy at Moscow.

U.S. Sends Radio and Television Specialists to U.S.S.R.

Press release 637 dated October 23

The Department of State announced on October 23 that a delegation of American radio and television specialists would arrive in the Soviet Union that week in furtherance of section II (5) of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on exchanges.¹ This section states:

Both parties will provide for an exchange of delegations of specialists in 1958 to study the production of radio and television programs, the techniques of sound recording, the equipment of radio and television studios, and the manufacture of films, recording tape, tape recorders, and records.

The members of the delegation are:

Ralph N. Harmon, vice president of engineering, Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc.
Jerry Danzig, vice president in charge of radio network programs, National Broadcasting Co., Inc.
Ralph Cohn, president, Screen Gems, Inc.
Mike Wallace, American Broadcasting Co.
Burton Paulu, director of radio and television broadcasting, General Extension Division, University of Minnesota

In reciprocity a Soviet delegation is expected to visit the United States in November.

¹ For text of agreement on exchanges in the cultural, technical, and educational fields, see BULLETIN of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.

The Bases of Peace

by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy¹

When we speak of peace we must always remember that peace is subject to more than one definition. Peace with the Communists can always be had if we are prepared to surrender. Whenever a condition of apparent peacefulness is pursued too narrowly or bought at the price of unwise concessions, real peace eludes us. Meaningful and lasting peace can only come as the end result of persistence and determination to maintain our ideals and strength with understanding and compassion.

Genuine peace obviously must rest upon a foundation of economic health and the political stability which flows from it. That applies to others as well as to ourselves.

There is often a lack of appreciation of the close relationship that exists between international trade, economic development, and the question of war or peace. We at times identify the causes of the Second World War, for example, with the personalities of certain political leaders—the Hitlers, the Mussolinis. We would do well to think also of the unhappy and tragic economic and social conditions of the twenties, which brought these leaders into power. We might bear in mind that any serious interruption of world trade and economic development, or frustrated hopes for better living standards, could again bring desperate men to power in one world area or another and thus evoke the threat of disturbance and war.

In a world where war is unthinkable as a means of settlement of disputes, an alternative must be devised. As our able Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has many times pointed out, the only substitute for the rule of war for the settlement of disputes is a rule of law.

International law has developed in several important ways in the past two decades. Yesterday we celebrated throughout the Nation the 13th anniversary of the coming into force of the United Nations Charter. This charter established certain basic principles of international law, notably in

¹ Remarks made at the Peace Award luncheon of the Catholic Association for International Peace at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 25 (press release 641 dated Oct. 24). Mr. Murphy was on this occasion the recipient of the association's annual Peace Award.

article 2, which deals with sovereign equality, the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, and the renunciation of the threat or use of force. These principles have been usefully applied, and thereby strengthened, in the settlement of an increasing number of disputes which in former times might have generated hostilities. It is a hopeful trend.

There has also been a healthy growth of the multilateral treaties. These prescribe rules of conduct in such matters as the treatment of aliens and international trade and constitute international law.

Another powerful force, perhaps the most powerful, is world opinion, sometimes expressed in gatherings of the United Nations General Assembly, at other times through diplomatic channels or in the press. World public opinion, wherever it enjoys freedom of the press, has come to play a role comparable to "common law" in the earlier days of our history. This force operates as a vital factor in the settlement of disputes and as a deterrent to the use of force. The assiduous attention to world opinion paid by the dictators of the Kremlin, even though cynical, bears testimony to the power it exercises.

Despite recent progress there is still more left to be done than has been done in developing international law to a point of full effectiveness as an instrument of guarding peace. That is where this association can be and is a most valuable instrument in promoting the rule of law in international relations.

Whatever our economic and legal achievements in behalf of peace, in the world as we know it we must unfortunately expect periodic crises. There will, no doubt, be attempts by ambitious and hostile elements to gain their ends by unlawful means. Each time this happens there are flashes of danger to the peace of the world. Then we usually witness agitation to make concessions, to "adjust" our foreign policy, to yield a point or two, to give away territory. If we do, it is then urged, we will regain control of leadership, this aggressor—the tiger—will be assuaged, tranquillity will be restored. Thus it was at the time of the Berlin blockade, of Korea, and in the Middle East, and most recently in the Formosa Strait. But, if we have learned anything as the result of experience in dealing with international commu-

nism since World War II, it is that our concessions are invariably considered a sign of weakness and stimulate a demand for more. It is our destiny to live in an era of struggle with an international movement intent on the creation of a new social order which would involve the destruction of the ideals of a Christian society. Until that movement is spent, we must be prepared for periodic crises in a series of probings and testing by the leadership of that movement. These probings and testing seek to ascertain points of weakness and disunity in the free world to promote the expansion of international communism. The tiger is never assuaged. He does understand and respect positions of strength.

For resisting and deterring aggression, and for containing violent outbreaks in the present world situation, there is no substitute for our strength, moral and physical, to stand firm.

At the start of the crisis in Taiwan Strait there were those who declared that our firm stand risked war. It is true that the stand we took involved risk, as will almost any course of action taken at a difficult time. But in our judgment a firm stand at that time and place involved the least risk, in the long run, to peace with freedom and honor in the world.

Essential to a sound foreign policy is our awareness that there is no riskless road to peace.

In guarding peace one further instrument always plays its quiet but essential part: That is diplomacy. In this connection it is to be remembered that His Holiness Pius XII was a highly skilled diplomat as well as a churchman.

I have spent most of my adult years in the United States Foreign Service; so it is perhaps natural that I should be a partisan of diplomacy as a force in world affairs. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the contribution diplomacy can make to strengthening the safeguards of peace and lessening the chance of war. In the shorter run diplomacy plays a necessary part in moderating or deflecting the perils of a crisis until time and better reason can open up alternatives. In the longer run the skills of diplomacy are essential for putting into effect the decisions of the statesman, thereby diverting the energies of men increasingly toward peaceful enterprises. Diplomacy has been justly called the first line of our defense.

It is my conviction that peace cannot be an end in itself, will never be won by itself. World peace is the result of economic health and political stability; of a rule of law gradually coming to supplant the rule of war; of the strength, physical and spiritual, to hold steady in the face of

crisis and to stand firm in resistance to aggressive force; of skilled and tireless diplomacy.

With you I pray that our nation may continue successfully to follow these four paths to peace and good will among men.

Problems Affecting International Trade

by Under Secretary Dillon¹

It is a great pleasure to me to have this opportunity to participate, for the first time, in an annual meeting of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The general agreement has steadily gained in strength and influence year by year, so that the meetings of the Contracting Parties have now become the major world forum for the discussion of trade policies on a broad international basis and for the settlement of international trade disputes. I think it is of considerable importance to the continuing vitality of the GATT institution that those of us who carry substantial responsibilities at home in the field of trade policy should meet from time to time, even if for only a few days, to become acquainted with one another, to exchange views, and to clarify the positions of our governments on important issues of concern to GATT.

U.S. Domestic Economy and International Trade

In my remarks today I would like first of all to say a few words about the state of our domestic economy. Then I will turn to some of the specific problems with which our various delegations will be concerned in the weeks ahead.

Since the 12th session held a year ago, the United States has gone through a business recession and is now well on the road to complete recovery. Our business contraction has had two major characteristics:

First, it has been short. The decline lasted only 8 months from the peak of economic activity,

which was reached in the third quarter of 1957, to the bottom, which was reached early in the second quarter of 1958. Since then our rate of recovery has been extraordinarily rapid. Present indications are that the whole of the drop will have been recovered by the end of the year, when our economy will begin once again to record new all-time highs.

Second, the recession has been relatively mild. The maximum drop in gross national production was only 4 percent. The maximum drop in personal income was only 2 percent.

The economy of the United States has shown remarkable strength and resiliency since the end of the war. While the expansion of our economy has been interrupted three times in the postwar period, in each case the halt was mild and brief. Powerful long-term forces for economic growth have dominated and continue to dominate the American economy. In addition, governmental measures—both automatic, built-in stabilizers and specific actions designed to meet the particular problems of each of the downturns—have played an important role in keeping these readjustments limited in time and extent. In short, the record of the economy of the United States since the war indicates that economic growth with reasonable stability can be achieved in a free society.

Of course, the chief anxiety of the rest of the world is that an American recession will adversely affect the international trade and monetary reserves of other countries. The international transactions of the United States during the 1957-58 recession have been characterized by a high level of American imports and a marked decline in American exports. These developments have been largely responsible for the recent

¹ Address made before the 13th session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at the ministerial level, at Geneva on Oct. 16 (press release 623 dated Oct. 17).

substantial improvement in the foreign-exchange position of the rest of the world as a whole. Also, I think that it is true, as mentioned by Mr. Per Jacobsson, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, at the recent meeting in New Delhi, that "the brunt of the reduced demand in the United States has, over a large field, so far fallen on the marginal domestic producers."

Looking back over developments in our foreign trade in recent years, I am led to make certain observations about the vulnerability of the rest of the world to economic fluctuations in the United States:

1. When consumer expenditures in the United States have been well maintained, as has been the case in each of our postwar recessions, our demand has remained strong for many types of imports, notably food and manufactures. This was particularly true in 1957-58, when our imports of manufactures actually increased.

2. Our demand for imports of industrial materials may be more adversely affected. The decline in the value of United States imports of industrial materials in 1957-58, however, was in large part a function of the drop in price. The reduction in the volume of these imports was quite mild.

3. United States Government transactions—foreign assistance and other Government expenditures abroad—have come to be a sizable part of our total outpayments to foreign countries. They are not directly responsive to changes in domestic business activity.

4. Our exports, on the other hand, seem to have become more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations abroad. After responding vigorously at times of peak foreign demand, as in early 1957, they have fallen off sharply when some slackening of foreign demand has appeared. There is no doubt that, because of the postwar growth and modernization of the productive capacity of other countries, United States exports face stronger competition in world markets today than they did a few years ago.

These various factors taken together clearly indicate that the effects of an American recession on the balance of payments of the United States, and hence on foreign countries, have been less than it was earlier thought they would be. The conclusions to be drawn from this are clear. It

is that government need not continue to be so apprehensive about periodic business movements in the American economy. In particular, the fear of a so-called dollar shortage should no longer be allowed to impede our common effort to move forward toward a fully liberalized multilateral trading system.

There are, however, other problems affecting international trade and payments. It is true, for example, that the less developed countries have encountered difficulties in their foreign trade and payments. This has been in large part the result of declining prices for primary products, a trend which began prior to the beginning of the recession in the United States and which, in the case of a number of commodities, was due to an imbalance between world supply and demand for basic products. A contributing cause in the case of some countries has been a continuing level of internal demand larger than could be justified by the total resources, domestic and foreign, at their disposal.

A new danger, which so far has principally affected the economies of the less developed countries, has been the recent dumping activities in a few key items by the Soviet Union and Communist China. The dumping of tin by the Soviet Union has served to disrupt the economy of Bolivia and to deal severe blows to the hopes of the peoples of Malaya and Indonesia for an improvement in their economic well-being. The dumping of textile products by Communist China is severely affecting the traditional export markets of India and Japan. It is thus making far more difficult the achievement on schedule of the second 5-year plan of India and hampering the economic growth of Japan.

As long as the Soviet Union and Communist China persist in these destructive trade practices the hope for a better life for millions of people in the less developed countries of the world will become even more difficult of realization.

I would like now to turn to some of the specific problems on our agenda.

Primary Commodities and Agricultural Protectionism

A few weeks ago we received the preliminary draft of the report² of our panel of experts on trends in international trade, with special em-

² Doc. MGT/80/58.

phasis on primary commodities and agricultural protectionism. This is, of course, a difficult as well as a controversial field, and it is not to be expected that governments will find all of the policy conclusions of the experts to their liking. Nevertheless, I think we can all agree that the report provides us with an excellent analysis on which to base our further examination of these problems and that the distinguished economists who prepared it—Professor [Gottfried] Haberler, Professor [James] Meade, Professor [Jan] Tinbergen, and Dr. [Roberto de Oliveira] Campos—deserve our warmest thanks.

This report will obviously require careful and thorough study. However, from a preliminary reading, there are two observations which I wish to make at this time.

First, we are impressed by the sections of the report dealing with the impact of internal taxes levied by certain industrialized countries, which severely limit the consumption of primary products such as coffee and tea, the market for which is of importance to the economic development of many countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. While recognizing the problems involved for certain countries in lifting the basis of their taxation, we hope that this portion of the report will receive serious attention with a resulting increase in the markets for these basic commodities.

Second, we welcome the emphasis in the report on the fact that the maintenance of a healthy international economic system is of much greater significance for the well-being of primary producers than are efforts to regulate production, prices, and trade in particular commodities. However, we find ourselves unable to concur with certain conclusions in the report relating to commodity stabilization schemes. Whereas the report appears to endorse the notion of the simultaneous negotiation of international stabilization schemes for a substantial number of commodities, we ourselves believe that commodity problems can best be approached on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the particular problem to be solved and the special circumstances surrounding production and trade for the commodity concerned. We note that the countries of the Commonwealth expressed much the same view as ours in the communique which they issued at the close of the recent Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference at Montreal.

The United States is now prepared to join in discussion of commodity problems on a case-by-case basis. We are already doing so with respect to coffee, and lead and zinc. Coffee, of course, is a commodity which we do not produce in the United States but which we heavily consume. Yet we have recognized the serious difficulties with which coffee producers in Latin America and Africa have been confronted and have been willing to sit down with them to try to work out a means of ameliorating these problems. In the case of lead and zinc, producers in the United States have been seriously injured by the worldwide decline in prices accompanied by extremely heavy increases in imports. This has forced a reduction in our domestic output of about 25 percent. In this situation we sought a multilateral solution by agreement between exporting and importing countries. When we found that there was no early prospect of dealing multilaterally with the problem, we were compelled to apply import restrictions on these products.³ We continue, however, to hope that it will be possible in the near future to reach multilateral understanding which will be acceptable to all.

My colleague from the U.K. this morning suggested that our recent actions on lead and zinc might well be discussed at this session. If the other Contracting Parties so desire we are, of course, prepared to join in such a discussion. However, I should like to point out that this subject is already being discussed by the countries directly concerned. The meeting of lead and zinc producing and consuming countries held in London early in September looked toward a further meeting of technical experts this fall for the purpose of seeking agreement on a multilateral program for these two commodities. The United States, as I have said, is prepared to take an active part in this endeavor. Until we know the results of these efforts, I seriously doubt the wisdom of initiating discussions on the same subject here in Geneva.

As regards the suggestion of my British colleague that there be a broad discussion of agricultural policies, the United States always stands ready to discuss its policies and is prepared to join in such a discussion if the other Contracting Parties so desire. Of course, the detailed pro-

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1958, p. 579 and p. 583.

cedural arrangements for such a discussion would necessarily be subject to further consideration by our various delegations.

The report of the panel of experts also speaks well, although with certain reservations, of the technique of achieving commodity price stabilization through the use of buffer stocks. The theory appears to be that by this means governments may be able to even out price fluctuations without resort to direct controls over production and trade. While recognizing the theoretical attraction of this approach, it is our view that international buffer-stock schemes do not offer a hopeful method of solving commodity problems. As the body of the report itself implies, the successful management of any buffer stock presumes an exceptional accuracy of human judgment and demands a foreknowledge of future economic events which we do not in fact possess. Because of these factors, it is our view that buffer-stock schemes are all too likely to break down completely or to lead to an aggravated form of the very restrictions on production and trade which they were originally designed to prevent.

GATT'S Relations With EEC

At their last annual session the Contracting Parties began to consider their future relationships with the European Economic Community. It was recognized then that the objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and those of the Treaty of Rome were basically in harmony, that together they aimed at the economic integration of countries in Western Europe within the framework of a liberal trading philosophy embracing the whole of the free world. The Contracting Parties recognized, too, that much thought would have to be given to the development of day-to-day working relationships with the Community of Six, so that the broad objectives of these two great international instruments would in fact be translated into practical achievements. My Government believes that this work has been well begun and should be continued on the present basis.

One of the most important aspects of the future relationship between the Common Market and the general agreement relates to the level of the Common Market tariff to be applied to imports into the Common Market from the territories of the other Contracting Parties. As a result of the ap-

proval by the United States Congress of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, my Government is now prepared to participate in tariff negotiations with the members of the European Economic Community and with other countries, to the end that mutually beneficial tariff concessions may be agreed upon. The trade agreements extension approved by our Congress—for a period of 4 years from July 1, 1958—is the longest in the history of our trade agreements legislation. Also, the extent of the basic authority granted to our President to reduce tariff rates makes it desirable that the Contracting Parties prepare for negotiations looking toward their completion prior to the expiration of our negotiating authority on July 1, 1962.

We also hope that, either during these negotiations or separately, the Community of Six will find it possible to reduce the Common Market tariffs on a number of tropical products which, under the Treaty of Rome, would be imported free of duty from the overseas territories of the Common Market while being subject to duty when imported from many of the less developed countries which are Contracting Parties to the general agreement.

There has been considerable concern in some quarters regarding the agricultural policies to be followed by the European Economic Community. For ourselves we believe that a guiding principle in the establishment of these policies should be the principle embodied in the general agreement; that is, that the trade of other Contracting Parties should not be faced with higher or more restrictive barriers to agricultural trade because of the formation of the Community. We are confident that this is the intention of the Community of Six. It is of course appropriate that the action of the Six in the agricultural field should come within the purview of the general agreement in the same way as other commercial regulations applied by the European Economic Community.

Dollar Liberalization

Finally I would like to say a word about dollar liberalization. The international payments situation of the countries of the free world has, by and large, continued to improve. Yet, in our judgment, the removal of balance-of-payments restrictions has not adequately kept pace with this improvement. On the one hand, we certainly

welcome the effective steps taken during the past year by the United Kingdom and Australia to remove or relax their remaining balance-of-payments restrictions. On the other hand, we regret that certain countries in a position to make greater progress in removing restrictions have failed so far to do so. In particular we hope that Germany and Austria will now agree to adequate measures of liberalization.

In the case of Germany this should in our view result in the elimination of the remaining restrictions on imports of industrial items and, with respect to agricultural items, either the elimination of restrictions or the negotiation of an agreed waiver of the applicable provisions of the general agreement.

We recognize that the substance of a waiver is naturally subject to negotiation and agreement between the Federal Republic and the other Contracting Parties, but we see no reason why a waiver should not be negotiated at this time so as to regularize the position of the Federal Republic in the same manner as other countries, including the United States, have regularized their position. We do not feel that the negotiation of a waiver should await a possible renegotiation of the GATT provisions on agriculture. Such a renegotiation would inevitably involve complex and difficult negotiations which might well take a number of years. The negotiation of a waiver would be a much simpler matter and could be accomplished at this session. We think this should be done so as to avoid the necessity for action under article XXIII.

In the case of Austria, her improved financial position is such that we see no reason why dollar discrimination on nonagricultural goods should not be substantially eliminated or why a further substantial step should not be taken in the reduction of discrimination on agricultural products.

We recognize, of course, that the sudden removal of balance-of-payments restrictions maintained for a long time may create real hardships

for domestic producers. Yet the answer to this problem is not the indefinite continuance of such restrictions contrary to the applicable provisions of the general agreement. If a country considers that it cannot promptly remove balance-of-payments restrictions which are no longer needed for financial reasons, then we think that the appropriate course is for such a country to agree with the Contracting Parties on the terms of a mutually acceptable waiver from the provisions of the general agreement.

In his excellent address to us this morning, our distinguished chairman [L. K. Jha] has made several suggestions as to how we might further strengthen the general agreement and better organize the work of the Contracting Parties. In particular, we wish to support the plan which he has outlined, whereby the Contracting Parties would meet in several sessions throughout the year, thus enabling them to handle their ordinary business with greater dispatch and to eliminate the present system of a single annual session which necessarily requires many weeks to complete. We also agree with the chairman that one of the most practicable means of overcoming some of GATT's administrative problems would be to create stronger permanent delegations of the Contracting Parties in Geneva so that urgent problems could be effectively discussed without the need for a formal session. The United States would be prepared to strengthen its permanent delegation for this purpose.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you on behalf of my Government for the wise guidance and outstanding qualities of leadership which you have brought to the deliberations of the Contracting Parties during the past year. I also want to pay tribute once again to our executive secretary, Mr. Wyndham White, who with his excellent and hard-working staff has so greatly helped to build the general agreement into the truly effective international economic institution which it is today.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.N. Committee Opens Debate on Disarmament

Following is a series of statements made in Committee I (Political and Security) by Henry Cabot Lodge and James W. Barco, U.S. Representatives to the General Assembly.

FIRST STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, OCTOBER 10

U.S. delegation press release 3013

We turn once again to the subject of disarmament, a subject in which the deep tensions afflicting the world are all too clearly reflected. It is a subject "piled high with difficulty," but so important for humanity that we must not become discouraged.

In this past year of disarmament talks the world had its share of difficulty—perhaps more than its share. There has also been progress. The scientists who met at Geneva have proved the worth of technical talks in one field of widespread concern—the means of detecting nuclear explosions. This is significant. There is also ground for hope that technical talks will open the way for forward steps to lessen the possibility of surprise attack. Indeed, this approach has wider implications for the whole field of disarmament.

Secretary-General Hammarskjold took a commendable initiative in proposing this item for our agenda this year. In his memorandum¹ he says, and we fully agree, "The attainment of balanced, worldwide disarmament through the United Nations must remain a primary objective of the organization." His is a most useful memorandum. I shall refer to it more than once in this statement.

The United States has always recognized the fundamental responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. We have cooperated wholeheartedly in every effort of this organization to solve the disarmament dilemma. We are

glad to give to this committee, and to the General Assembly, an accounting of our efforts in the past year.

To put our present work in perspective, let me recall briefly, and without any recrimination, some of the events of the past year. A year ago, in the 12th General Assembly, our debates on disarmament began under a cloud. All the hopes of agreement built up during months of careful diplomacy in the London Subcommittee talks had suddenly been disappointed.

The General Assembly responded wisely to that rather frustrating situation. It endorsed a reasonable set of principles for a disarmament agreement. It also enlarged the Disarmament Commission to its present composition of 25 members, in the well-justified expectation that this would meet the Soviet view.²

However, Mr. Chairman, it must be set down as a fact that up to this moment the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee have been prevented by the Soviet Union from any further useful efforts.

Much as we regretted the Soviet attitude, we refused to be deterred. The most important thing was to keep working on the job which the United Nations had given us, even if this meant doing our work outside the formal structure of the United Nations.

Question of Nuclear Weapons Tests

We concentrated first on the problem of suspending nuclear weapons tests—the first point in the program endorsed by the General Assembly a year ago. One big difficulty here has always been how to make sure that a pledge to refrain from testing was not being violated in secret. On April 28 President Eisenhower proposed to Premier Khrushchev that technical discussions be

¹ U.N. doc. A/3936.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 961.

held to see whether scientists from both sides could work out a practical way to detect nuclear explosions.³

These talks actually began in Geneva on July 1. Scientific experts from both sides met at the European Office of the United Nations, with a representative of the Secretary-General present at all the meetings. Three of the most eminent scientists of the United States attended the meetings: Dr. James B. Fisk, Dr. Robert F. Bacher, and the late Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence. The other participants were of similar standing in their countries. We are glad to say that the discussions from start to finish remained almost completely scientific and nonpolitical.

After 7 weeks the talks resulted in an agreed report. The means of detecting violations of a possible test suspension are set forth in the report which was submitted to the United Nations by United States and Soviet representatives and which has been circulated as document A/3897 [dated September 30].⁴

Mr. Chairman, when this technical agreement was reached on August 21 we lost no time in taking the next forward step. The following day President Eisenhower proposed prompt negotiations for an actual agreement "for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the experts' report."⁵ We are gratified that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union have now agreed on the proposed negotiations, which are scheduled to begin in Geneva on October 31.

Making his proposal President Eisenhower announced that the United States was willing, "unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing on its part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the negotiations." We regret that Mr. Gromyko in his press conference the other day threw doubt upon his Government's willingness to stop tests. We hope that what Mr. Gromyko said does not mean that he is looking

³ For text of President Eisenhower's letter, see *ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 811.

⁴ For a statement by Dr. Fisk and texts of a communique and the final report (without annexes), see *ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 452.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378.

for a way to justify continued unrestricted testing by the Soviet Union now that some progress has been made toward agreement. We hope that his Government is not trying to evade acceptance of the offer the United States made. This offer was made to facilitate these negotiations, and it would be regrettable indeed if the Soviet Union took steps which had the opposite effect.

When the United States made that offer, Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Union had not carried out any nuclear tests since March—about 5 months. In recent weeks they have resumed testing. The question may therefore be asked whether the United States offer still holds. I am authorized to assure the United Nations on behalf of the United States Government that, as President Eisenhower announced, we will withhold further testing for 1 year from the date the negotiations begin—unless, of course, the Soviet Union conducts further tests beyond that date.

The question of nuclear testing has been the subject of many proposals. We are especially glad that progress has been possible this year on this particular aspect of the complex armaments question. We are measurably closer than we were a year ago to an actual long-range suspension of nuclear tests. The reason for this is that both sides recognized the need for control. The scientists have shown that a technique for detection is possible. Thus the vital element has been supplied without which confidence is impossible and without which any agreement in this field must end in disillusionment: the element of inspection and control.

It remains to be seen whether this technical agreement can be translated into political reality. We will go into the Geneva talks determined to achieve an agreement.

It is apparent to everyone in this room that United States policy on the question of tests has evolved considerably in the last year. Perhaps I may be forgiven for saying that it is a good thing when government policies do evolve and are not frozen for all time. And I should add that one of the big factors in our evolution has been the opinions expressed here in the United Nations. We are a country which respects the United Nations and which heeds its expressions of opinion—and which takes account of minorities views expressed here.

Guarding Against Surprise Attack

The method of technical talks among experts gives promise of progress in a second field—guarding against surprise attack. Since 1955, when President Eisenhower made his open-skies proposal, the United States has sought persistently to curb the danger of surprise attack by air and ground inspection.

Since last spring the United States has been discussing this matter with the Soviet Government. We now have good reason to expect that a meeting of experts, to explore the practical aspects of safeguarding against surprise attack, will begin in Geneva on November 10.⁶ We will do our best to see that these technical discussions are as successful as those on nuclear testing. We hope that these talks, too, will be followed by negotiations which will in turn lead to measures to minimize the dangers of surprise attack. And if that is done, a great step will have been taken toward the mutual confidence we all seek and away from the fear of global war.

Mr. Chairman, the momentum created by these developments must not be lost. The Secretary-General, in his memorandum of September 30 on disarmament, has stated very well the hopeful prospects before us. After referring to the conference of experts on detecting nuclear explosions, he says:

. . . a technical approach to such subjects as leave room for study of a non-political nature, similar to that employed in the Geneva talks, would seem to provide possibilities for further progress in disarmament. I believe that all such possibilities should be fully explored. Steps in this direction, as the work of the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and the Second International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy has demonstrated, might also lead to a steady and progressive exchange of information concerning military technologies and armaments. The lack of confidence between States in this respect hitherto has been one of the major causes of fear, suspicion and international tension. The General Assembly might wish to consider the value of endorsing the principle of openness of information in the armaments and allied fields as one which could contribute significantly to reduce international tension and promote progress toward disarmament.

We agree with those observations. The United States believes in the principle of openness. We

agree with Mr. Hammarskjold that it has particular significance in the disarmament field. We are encouraged by its success in the fields which he has mentioned. We would like to apply it in the future in new technical discussions on several different fronts in the disarmament field.

A New Approach to Disarmament

Now, encouraging and important as these developments which I have described are, it is only prudent to recognize that, as isolated steps, they do not deal with the heart of the problem of disarmament. But these developments illustrate the fruitfulness of the new approach we have taken—an approach which means that we should stop arguing about generalities and get down to practical and specific discussions on how various disarmament measures, which we all agree desirable, can actually be applied and enforced. We need no longer argue theory. Let us jointly explore the facts. It has been shown that such discussions—technical discussions—can be undertaken without prejudice to the basic position of the various governments concerned. We should, therefore, make the most of these discussions.

I should like now to set down some of the significant questions to which this new approach might ultimately be applied.

1. *Conventional Arms and Armed Forces.* This remains a vitally important part of disarmament. We have through the years confronted such questions as conventional armaments and the size of standing armies. All of those concerned have agreed that any significant disarmament agreement must meet the issue of controlled limitations on armaments and armed forces and the consequent reductions in military expenditures. There is agreement on figures for levels of armed forces. There is, of course, dispute about the extent to which these reductions could be put into effect without regard to the settlement of certain political issues which cause states to regard armed forces as necessary for their security. But there is no agreement on the measures which would be required to insure the faithful carrying out of any reductions on which agreement might be obtained. Surely an exploration of the technical aspects of controlling conventional armaments and armed forces would be worth while. If nothing else, it would bring us closer to agreement on what it

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1958, p. 648; for an announcement of the U.S. delegation, see *ibid.*, Nov. 3, 1958, p. 688.

would be feasible to do to lessen the threat of large armies and great stocks of modern weapons. This alone would constitute substantial progress in a field now devoid of it.

2. *Nuclear Weapons.* Both sides have likewise agreed that the objective of a disarmament agreement would be to deal realistically with the nuclear threat. The United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and France have proposed that early steps be taken to insure the cessation of manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the beginning of transfer to peaceful uses of the fissionable materials presently tied up in stocks of nuclear weapons. The U.S.S.R. has spoken of the "cessation of manufacture" of these weapons but has tied this action to the complete prohibition and liquidation of weapons stockpiles. This is a measure which, however desirable, we believe is uncontrollable. Here is another problem where, by technical discussions, again without prejudice to the basic position of either side, we might be able to find out just what it would be humanly possible to do and what kind of control system could be devised to insure the carrying out of these measures.

3. *Outer Space.* A year ago in this committee the United States asked that a beginning be made on control of the disarmament aspect of outer space.⁷ We proposed that the Soviet Union join us in studying the terms of an inspection system which would assure that outer space would not be used for military purposes. Outer-space missiles armed with nuclear warheads are now a reality. With particular emphasis, therefore, the United States reaffirms this proposal and its willingness to take part in technical discussions in this field.

Studies of the measures I have mentioned would only be a first, though indispensable, step. What counts is actually putting them into effect. In all these regards the United States is willing to move ahead on any measures which offer reasonable prospects for agreement. But if such negotiations are to hold promise we believe they should be based on a solid technical groundwork which sets forth the facts on what is feasible and controllable.

Mr. Chairman, these brief remarks have summed up what the United States regards as the most hopeful and worthwhile events of the past year in the disarmament field. We have sketched out what we think are the most promising possibili-

ties for immediate progress. We have by no means mentioned all the major events of the year, some of which have been bitterly disappointing. In a field so demanding and so difficult as this we must try not to "look back in anger." We must look forward to those points of light which show us the way out of the forest.

The United States believes that the most light at this stage can be shed by the scientific and technical approach, because in that way we can lay a sound basis for actual disarmament measures, in that way we can talk the same language, and in that way we can avoid the distressing recriminations of past years. We believe that the constructive thing for the General Assembly to do at this point is to encourage the forthcoming talks.

This is a time for self-restraint. It is a time when the General Assembly can act most constructively not by raising for further discussions various issues well known to us from past debates but by lending its support to the delicate and promising work which is already in hand or about to begin in Geneva.

Many good possibilities lie beyond that work. The important thing is that the next step should succeed.

Valuable Principles for Negotiations

From our 12 years' experience in disarmament negotiations a number of valuable principles have emerged.

1. Any measures undertaken must be capable of verification and control. We have learned through the past lessons of history that any agreement based on good faith and promises alone leads to an increase rather than a lessening of tensions. Confidence created by confirmation is the only sure foundation for progress toward effective arms limitation and control.

2. Drastic reduction of our armaments and armed forces can be realistically expected when the existing political situation has improved. We continue to believe that the partial approach adopted by the Assembly in 1955 is the proper one. We believe that high armaments levels are the product of international tensions and also that they tend to increase these tensions. Accordingly we believe that limited conventional arms reductions along with other measures can be taken now—without awaiting political settlements. Such reductions would lead to a lessening of ten-

⁷ *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1957, p. 667.

sions. This would facilitate political agreements and would, in turn, allow states to accept with confidence more drastic cuts.

3. The relationship between conventional and nuclear armaments dictates the need for arms limitations in both fields to proceed concurrently. The United States believes that disarmament must be balanced to assure each state that its security is not impaired. We could not accept nor do we expect others to accept unbalanced measures of disarmament which call for abandonment of a nuclear deterrent while allowing conventional arms and manpower in unlimited quantities. If they are to be controlled, the measures for so doing should proceed in a manner which does not offer one side a military advantage over the other.

4. A complete and permanent cessation of nuclear weapons testing can come with progress toward lessening the nuclear threat; reducing the high level of nonnuclear arms; and minimizing the danger of surprise attack. In other words, if the United States is to give up its ability to improve its defensive weapons, then there must be corresponding limitations on the ability of other states to increase their weapons stocks and to maintain large armed forces.

President Eisenhower in his statement of August 22, to which I have already referred, announcing the United States test suspension, said:

As the United States has frequently made clear, the suspension of testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons is not, in itself, a measure of disarmament or a limitation of armament. An agreement in this respect is significant if it leads to other and more substantial agreements relating to limitation and reduction of fissionable material for weapons and to other essential phases of disarmament. It is in this hope that the United States makes this proposal.

We sincerely hope that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests will be reached at the coming negotiations. It is our hope that this will eventually lead to a permanent test suspension. Let me add that the United States has stated its willingness to negotiate a cessation of nuclear weapons tests in the interests of encouraging the Soviet Union to make a comparable move forward.

The present situation, wherein states have a capability for mutual destruction, is fraught with danger for all the world. We must not allow this dangerous state of affairs to go on. Unilateral or

unbalanced disarmament, or disarmament based on good faith alone, would but add to the danger of war. For those who cherish peace and justice and do not harbor aggressive purposes, other ways must be found. We offer a practical, positive beginning. Let us not miss this opportunity. Let us turn the corner toward a relaxation of the present tension and danger. The survival of civilization is at stake.

There exists today some real momentum toward progress in the disarmament effort, with all that this implies for humanity. We ask the Assembly to help us maintain that momentum. Thus we can hope to move toward the day when the nations can lay down their burden of armaments and their still heavier burden of fear.

SECOND STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, OCTOBER 10

U.S. delegation press release 3014

I merely want to take a moment, under the right of reply.

Mr. Zorin⁸ has given you words about the United States position. I would like to give you some facts.

The United States position on suspension of nuclear weapons tests is not conditional on the existence of an entire disarmament plan. We will suspend for 1 year without controls, unless the Soviet Union continues testing during that period. And we are ready to extend our suspension indefinitely as long as each year we know that the inspection system is working and we are making reasonable progress on other aspects of disarmament.

Then, Mr. Chairman, we are in favor of comprehensive disarmament. It is the fact that the Soviet Union has always prevented agreement on this which has impelled us to go ahead on test suspension as something which may be possible to attain. But we shall continue to work for comprehensive disarmament.

In one breath Mr. Zorin criticizes us for not being in favor of a comprehensive plan, and in the next breath he criticizes us for not being in favor of going ahead on an individual basis. No matter what we do we are wrong, according to Mr. Zorin.

⁸ Valerian A. Zorin, Soviet representative to the General Assembly.

Our policy has evolved, as anyone who could remember last year knows. He would have you believe that it has not evolved.

Mr. Chairman, future historians may be able to explain why the Soviet Union in this year of 1958 thought it worth while to make these flagrant and obvious distortions of United States policy, even including the imputing to us of unworthy motives, in this committee which contains many of the most sophisticated and the most experienced men in the world in the field of diplomacy and of world politics. Surely he cannot hope to delude the members of this committee. Maybe his hope is that bits and pieces of these distortions will find their way into the press of the world and will influence the public. But here too he underestimates the public and its knowledge of what the truth really is.

STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, OCTOBER 13

U.S. delegation press release 3017

I have asked to speak again in order to explain the draft resolution sponsored by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Iran, Italy, Laos, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States, which has been circulated as document A/C.1/L.205. This resolution outlines policies and procedures which would make a concrete contribution to disarmament. It deals with test suspension, surprise attack, further initiatives, and the relationship of the United Nations to them.

Let me comment briefly on these matters in the order that they appear in the operative paragraphs.

1. *Test Suspension.* There is a widespread desire among all members of the United Nations—a desire fully shared by the United States—for an early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control. Paragraph 1 of the resolution stresses the importance which the General Assembly attaches to the success of the October 31 conference between the U.S.S.R., the United States, and the United Kingdom. It urges the parties to "make every effort to reach *early agreement*." This is strong language. Such action by the General Assembly should encourage the participants to do everything in their power to make the conference a success.

Paragraph 2 urges the parties involved not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while the negotiations are going on. The United States and the United Kingdom have already volunteered to stop nuclear weapons tests for 1 year beginning October 31, provided the Soviet Union does not conduct tests during that period. We hope the Soviet Union will stop its tests. The cosponsors considered that a halt on tests during the negotiations will facilitate a lasting agreement. As I said Friday [October 10], we are ready to extend our suspension indefinitely as long as each year we know that an agreed inspection system is working and that we are making reasonable progress on other aspects of disarmament.

2. *Surprise Attack.* Another important issue which has concerned us all has been the increasing danger of surprise attack in an era when the warning time has been reduced to minutes. President Eisenhower's open-skies proposal of 1955 and the recent United States efforts in the Security Council to achieve agreement on an Arctic inspection zone⁹ exemplify this concern. It has also been reflected in the disarmament proposals of the Soviet Union.

We hope there will be a serious effort to reach understanding in the November 10 Geneva meeting on the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack. If these talks are successfully concluded and an agreement is subsequently reached, its practical benefits would be of great value. Among other things it would increase the confidence among states which is indispensable for rapid progress on disarmament. Reflecting these considerations, paragraph 3 calls attention to the urgency of reaching the widest possible measure of agreement in the prospective technical talks on measures against surprise attack.

3. *Objectives.* Paragraph 4 reflects the determination of the sponsors that the technical approach, as well as other approaches, should be pursued vigorously toward achieving the ultimate goal of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. It has become apparent that technical studies can be an effective means to this end. The General Assembly should build on the recent success of the Geneva technical talks on nuclear testing.

The resolution therefore encourages an exten-

⁹ BULLETIN of May 19, 1958, p. 816.

sion of this approach to other aspects of the disarmament problem with a view toward finally achieving the longstanding goal of the United Nations—a balanced and effectively controlled worldwide system of disarmament.

4. *Role of the United Nations.* The United Nations has a vital responsibility in the field of disarmament. The last section of the resolution states explicitly how the conferences and the United Nations can assist each other.

Paragraph 5 invites the forthcoming conferences to avail themselves of the assistance and services of the Secretary-General. We are pleased that both sides in these conferences have, in fact, already been working with the Secretary-General to this end.

Paragraph 5 also calls for the United Nations to be kept informed about the forthcoming conferences. This is obviously important.

Paragraph 6 reflects the significant role that the Secretary-General can play. He is invited, in consultation with the governments concerned, not only to give such advice as may seem appropriate to facilitate the current developments but also with respect to any further initiatives on disarmament.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, paragraph 7 assures that the deliberations of the General Assembly and the proposals made here should be taken into account by the states and experts involved in the forthcoming conferences.

The United States hopes that the General Assembly will unanimously endorse the principles outlined in this resolution. They are positive, forward-looking measures consistent with the obligations of this body and with the overwhelming aspirations of mankind.

STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, OCTOBER 15

U.S. delegation press release 3028

Let me advert briefly to the statement by the representative of the Soviet Union yesterday that the Soviet Union had accepted the system of control proposed by the conference of experts on nuclear tests while the United States and the United Kingdom had not.

I am glad to state here and now in the clearest possible language that the United States has accepted and does accept the report of the experts,

including the control system therein contained. Let that be understood.

Let me also remind the committee that President Eisenhower welcomed what he called the "successful conclusion" of the talks on the very day after they ended. He proposed that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States meet to reach agreement on the suspension of tests "on the basis" of that report, and the Soviet Union accepted this.

The United States has also stated that the findings of the experts at Geneva should form the basis for the actual establishment of an international control system for any agreed suspension of nuclear weapons testing. The experts made recommendations, and everyone understood that the next step was for governmental representatives to act on these recommendations. We are convinced that putting into effect the recommendations of the experts will make the conference a success.

Now, Mr. Chairman, why the Soviet Union tries to obscure these facts or appears to engage in a quibble about them is a mystery to me. I therefore repeat categorically, so that there is no confusion, that the United States accepts the report of the experts, including the control system contained therein.

Now, Mr. Chairman, having said this, I think we should remove the implication which Mr. Zorin sought to read into what either his or our "acceptance" means.

The report contains a set of scientific facts arrived at by some of the world's best experts after mature deliberation. They are scientific facts, and we accept them. The controls recommended are those which would be needed to police a discontinuance of tests. They can, if the nations will it, be translated into practical arrangements at the forthcoming political conference.

The Geneva report says that most tests can be detected by inspection machinery including 170 to 180 inspection posts, by aerial observations, and by on-the-spot investigations. To this the Soviet Union has agreed.

But the Soviet Union has not yet agreed on the nature of the supervisory body, the composition of the inspection teams, the location of control posts, the immunities and privileges of inspecting personnel, and the like. These were not discussed in Geneva. As mutually agreed, they did not fall

within the provisions of the technical conference. They had to be left for political negotiations. The "acceptance" of a control system by the Soviet Union at this stage means no more than Soviet recognition that the technical conclusions are correct. The task remains to put living flesh onto these bones.

In short, the Soviet Union has not yet agreed to the actual establishment of effective controls.

The Soviet Union can destroy all the progress made this summer by refusing at the forthcoming talks to give the inspection machinery proper facilities to function in the Soviet Union. We hope they will not, but the world should be aware that they will have ample opportunity to do so.

So much, Mr. Chairman, for the report of the experts.

Then Mr. Zorin alleged that our position on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests has not evolved since the 1957 London disarmament meeting. Such a statement on his part in the face of our offer to suspend tests for 1 year reflects a complete unwillingness to recognize a gesture of compromise.

Then, too, the representative of the Soviet Union also said that the question of a suspension of nuclear weapons tests was simply one of halting the tests. According to him, you just stop, pure and simple.

Now, Mr. Chairman, that is not the question. The question is whether we achieve a discontinuance of tests under controls so that the discontinuance is real and whether this agreement will lead to further progress on the disarmament problem. When the Soviet representative takes the line that he has taken, he invariably opens himself up to this kind of question: Is the Soviet Union against real controls? One is bound to ask oneself that question. Does the Soviet Union wish to evade test suspension once it has agreed to it? Is the Soviet Union reluctant to reach agreement on arms-limitation problems? Does the Soviet Union object to substantial progress being made in disarmament? These, I submit very candidly, are the types of questions to which Mr. Zorin's remarks naturally give rise.

I note that the Soviet resolution¹⁰ does not mention controls at all. It is, as well, devoid of any reference to real disarmament.

Now, Mr. Chairman, there is a road to a per-

manent cessation of testing. It is through agreement, not through pronouncements. If the Soviet Union wants to continue its propaganda slogan "stop the tests"—period, full stop—it can do so. If it shares the desires of others to achieve a real and effective cessation, it can go to Geneva and negotiate with candor and in good faith.

We offer a workable, quick plan to halt nuclear tests. Mr. Zorin appears to spurn it. I hope I misunderstand him, but I warn him now that, if he persists in vetoing inspection schemes and in turning down offers to suspend tests, the world will be able to draw only the most unfortunate conclusions about the Soviet Union's true intentions.

The United States will go to the Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing with the determination to reach an equitable and lasting agreement. We want to make this conference, as well as the technical talks on surprise attack, a success. We hope that in spite of their disquieting attitude here in this committee the Soviet Union will do the same.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind the committee once again that in accordance with our frequently restated announcements the United States and the United Kingdom will discontinue tests on October 31, the end of this month, provided the Soviet Union does the same.

The Soviet Union has been totally and monumentally silent on this point.

Will the Soviet Union stop?

We would like to have a clear answer to that.

STATEMENT BY MR. BARCO, OCTOBER 17

U.S. delegation press release 3028

The representative of the Soviet Union made a number of assertions which are so far from the truth that I feel compelled to reply to him.

The Soviet representative stated that what the United States has in mind is a temporary suspension only and only for 1 year. He asks the question, "Why do not the sponsors of the 17-power resolution set cessation as a goal?" And he answers the question by saying, "Because they do not think in these terms; they do not think of cessation as a goal, but only in terms of a suspension for 1 year, and not for a definitive solution." Then he makes the totally outrageous suggestion that the United States wants to suspend only for 1 year to give time to prepare for another series of tests.

¹⁰U.N. doc. A/C. 1/L. 203.

Mr. Chairman, these assertions are just totally wrong. They are totally upside down. I do not know what one can say here to convince Mr. Zorin.

The representative of the United States has made very clear what the goal is, as far as we are concerned. He has made very clear that we are working for an agreement that can lead to the cessation of tests. But none of this seems to affect the attitude of the Soviet representative.

We have said that we will discontinue for 1 year our tests beginning October 31 if the U.S.S.R. also does so. Mr. Lodge asked Mr. Zorin the question, "Is the U.S.S.R. going to do the same?" And we have not had an answer to that question. I would like to have an answer to that question.

[In a further intervention Mr. Barco said:]

Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind the representative of the Soviet Union that the representative of the United States has also asked him the question whether he disagrees that there should be further progress on disarmament. I think this is a matter which requires some clarification from him.

I would like to say one more thing about the use of these words of "cessation" and "suspension" and "discontinuance" and so forth. We are not dealing here with slogans, however much the representative of the Soviet Union would like us to. We are dealing with serious problems of how to achieve disarmament and all the things that go with it. And these slogans which he likes to foist upon us are not going to achieve that.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Security Council

Fourth Report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. Submitted through the Secretary-General in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 11 June 1958 (S/4023). S/4100. September 29, 1958. 21 pp., map, mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

General Assembly

Supplementary Estimates for the Financial Year 1958. Report of the Secretary-General. A/3922. September 22, 1958. 36 pp. mimeo.

Association of Non-Self-Governing Territories With the European Economic Community. Report of the Secretary-General. A/3916/Rev. 1. September 24, 1958. 28 pp. mimeo.

UNREF Executive Committee. Report on the First Session of the Working Party on Future International Assistance to Refugees, 21-27 August 1958. A/AC.79/130. September 25, 1958. 12 pp. mimeo.

Question of Disarmament. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. A/3936. September 30, 1958. 4 pp. mimeo.

Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds. A/3944. October 9, 1958. 16 pp. mimeo.

United Nations Emergency Force: Summary Study of the Experience Derived From the Establishment and Operation of the Force. Report of the Secretary-General. A/3943. October 9, 1958. 81 pp. mimeo.

Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries: Establishment of the Special Fund. Report of the Secretary-General. A/3947. October 13, 1958. 20 pp. mimeo.

U.S. Views on the U.N. Budget for 1959

*Statement by Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

Once again this year we are indebted to the Secretary-General and to the chairman of the Advisory Committee for their general statements on the budget of the organization for 1959. These statements, I am certain, have been helpful to all members of this committee in our approach to the budgetary problems which face us for the coming year.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment briefly on the present level of the budget and the increase forecast by the Secretary-General for the 1959 budget. We all consider that the budget level is high, but frankly, Mr. Chairman, we do not believe that it is too high when we view the responsibilities which governments have placed upon the organization in recent years. By the same token, while we are concerned at the size of the increase for 1959 forecast by the Secretary-General, we cannot say that the increase is excessive in view of the activities which we expect the organization to carry on in the coming year. Having said this, Mr. Chairman, I must caution that the present budget level and the rate of increase has become such that the Secretary-General, the Advisory Committee, and the Fifth Committee

¹ Made in Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary) on Oct. 14 (U.S. delegation press release 3020).

must exercise the greatest care to assure that no unwise or unnecessary expenditures are incurred.

Recommendations of Secretary-General and Advisory Committee

Before discussing any of the specific problems involved, I would like to indicate the general approach of the United States delegation to a consideration of the estimates. First of all, we have full confidence in the Secretary-General and the Controller, and we consider that any budget estimates which they present to us have been most carefully prepared with a view to the greatest possible economy consistent with the efficient operation of the organization. However, the General Assembly has created the mechanism of the Advisory Committee—a committee of administrative and financial experts—to examine in detail the estimates prepared by the Secretary-General and to bring a competent and objective judgment to bear upon those estimates. As we all know, that committee spends many months in examining the estimates and it provides us with its recommendations with respect to them. It is obvious that the Fifth Committee cannot repeat the detailed examination carried out by the Advisory Committee, and it would seem equally obvious that we should not spend our time in a detailed discussion of all budget sections when we have on our agenda so many matters of principle requiring decisions. However, we do believe we should make a careful examination of the items as to which there is a difference between the request of the Secretary-General and the recommendation of the Advisory Committee.²

It follows, Mr. Chairman, that it is the view of the United States delegation that this committee should give most serious consideration to the recommendations of the Advisory Committee and should support those recommendations except in those instances of disagreement where the Secretary-General can make a clear and compelling case of his original estimates. It is our position that a recommendation of the Advisory Committee for a modification of the original estimates does not constitute an attack upon the judgment or administrative approach of the Secretary-General but

² For the budget estimates of the Secretary-General for 1959, see U.N. doc. A/3825; for the report of the Advisory Committee and recommendations on revised estimates, see U.N. docs. A/3860, 3923, 3924, and 3933.

rather represents an objective judgment and appraisal of the situation which results in a conclusion different from that of the Secretary-General. We believe that the Secretary-General should, and no doubt does, give serious consideration to the recommendations of the Advisory Committee which differ from his own and that he should accept them unless he believes he can clearly and persuasively demonstrate that the recommendations of the Advisory Committee are not in the best interests of the organization.

The administrator proposing a budget and the policy-determining body may well view the same problem from different angles and may therefore reach different conclusions.

Applying these principles to the budget estimates and to the report of the Advisory Committee which are before us, we are prepared, in general, to support the recommendations of the Advisory Committee. I have used the phrase "in general," Mr. Chairman, because we retain an open mind and are prepared to hear any case which the Secretary-General may wish to put before us.

We listened carefully to the statement made by the Secretary-General on October 9³ in which he asked for a restoration of \$170,000 of the amount which the Advisory Committee has recommended be cut from his budget request. I must say, Mr. Chairman, that only with respect to the restoration of an amount of \$27,800 in Section 11 [General Expenses] do we presently agree, but we still reserve our final position on this section. I might say at this point that, if it is decided that a restoration is warranted in section 11, we expect that every possible effort will be made to avoid supplementary estimates with respect to this section next year. We do not believe that a rise in prices or increased cost for utilities should automatically become a basis for supplementary estimates, and we would expect that every effort would be made to find economies which would compensate for these factors.

Salaries and Wages

With respect to Section 6 [Salaries and Wages], my delegation does not feel that a case has been made for rejecting the recommendations of the Advisory Committee. While we appreciate the

³ For text, see U.N. doc. A/C.5/748.

willingness of the Secretary-General not to contest the major portion of the recommended cut and not to insist upon the addition of professional posts, we are not prepared to agree to the establishment of 21 General Service posts. We realize, of course, that a strong argument can be made for the necessity of many of these posts as essential requirements for existing regional commissions; nevertheless we believe that we must look at the picture of regional commissions and economic activities as a whole.

In view of the fact that a new regional economic commission is being established for Africa, with a consequent substantial increase in expenditures, my delegation believes we should go more slowly with respect to the other commissions for the time being. In other words, we are quite prepared to accept a growth of expenditure with respect to the regional economic commissions as a whole, but we believe that the pace of this growth must be maintained within the financial capabilities of the organization.

Travel

With respect to Section 8 [Travel], we again are not persuaded that the Advisory Committee's recommendation should be rejected. I might recall at this point, Mr. Chairman, that last year we supported the Secretary-General's request for restoration of a cut proposed in the estimates for travel on official business. This year, however, we believe that the situation is somewhat different and we believe that the cut proposed by the Advisory Committee will not make impossible any travel which is really necessary. In this connection we have noted the recent statement of the Controller that an attempt is being made to reach agreement with the specialized agencies on a modification of certain of the regulations presently in force with respect to travel. We hope that any agreement which is reached will make it possible to achieve additional economies.

As regards Section 10 [Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees], the U.S. delegation is, of course, prepared to withhold any judgment until we have heard the views of the High Commissioner himself.

The last item of reduction which is contested by the Secretary-General relates to the proposed appropriation of \$2,000 for the payment of

honoraria to the president and members of the Administrative Tribunal. We regret that this proposal has been made by the Secretary-General in view of the decision arrived at by this committee 2 years ago on the matter of paying honoraria. We are not aware of any change in circumstance during the past 2 years. Accordingly, it is our present feeling that we should not change our earlier decision in this matter.

I would like to refer, Mr. Chairman, to several other matters which were mentioned by the Secretary-General and by the chairman of the Advisory Committee in their statements to us. First of all, my delegation believes that an increase in the level of the Working Capital Fund is fully justified. We would be prepared to support an increase to the level of \$30 million. However, if the majority of this committee believes that such an increase would impose too great a burden, we would be prepared to concur in the Advisory Committee's recommendation to increase the level to \$25 million spread over 2 or 3 years.

One of the most important and helpful portions of this year's Advisory Committee report is the section covering the special study made of the Offices of the Controller and of Personnel. We consider that such special studies of particular areas of the Secretariat are highly useful, and we look forward to similar efforts in the future. The study made this year impels us to conclude that the level of performance of the two offices studied is high, and accordingly we wish to compliment the responsible Secretariat officials in those offices.

However, Mr. Chairman, we are surprised at an omission from the Advisory Committee's report on its special study of the Controller's office. Last year the United States delegation placed great emphasis on the establishment in that office of a small management staff which would have as one of its principal functions the making of periodic surveys of overseas establishments. We understood that the Controller intended to create such a unit, and yet we find no specific mention of it in the Advisory Committee's report. Accordingly, we hope to hear the comment of the Controller and of the chairman of the Advisory Committee on this matter. At this time I will limit myself to saying that we consider the establishment of this management staff so important that we would

be prepared to see the addition, if necessary, of several new posts in the Controller's office for this purpose.

Control of Administrative and Financial Services

It is with some hesitation, Mr. Chairman, that I now mention a point of some delicacy. This is the matter, mentioned in paragraphs 256-258 and paragraph 295 of the Advisory Committee's report, on the question of the overall direction of the administrative and financial services of the organization. We listened very carefully to the Secretary-General's statement on this point, and we realize that it was with all sincerity that he assured us that the present arrangements are fully satisfactory. He stated that his personal experience did not lead him to share the views of the Advisory Committee. Mr. Chairman, our experience in observing the functioning of the organization from the outside—as opposed to the Secretary-General's observation of the functioning from within—leads us respectfully to differ with his conclusion.

The Secretary-General states that he does not see the slightest justification for proposing a new post in the organization, a position with special senior status and relationship to the Secretary-General, which would combine overall control of the administrative and financial services.

We are all well aware of the Secretary-General's outstanding capabilities for harmonizing conflicting views in the political sphere. We are also well aware of his superior ability in dealing with the numerous complex problems of operating as widespread and varied an organization as the Secretariat. However, we believe that the combination of these two roles creates a burden greater than any one man—even one with the ability and devotion of the Secretary-General—should be called upon to carry. We feel that we should not impose such a burden on him and that likewise he should not be required to impose it on himself. We, therefore, continue to believe that the centering of staff work on the administrative and financial services of the organization in a special senior post would be in the best interest of the organization.

We, of course, realize, Mr. Chairman, that this is a matter which is in the hands of the Secretary-General to decide. Nevertheless, it is our duty

as a member of the organization to point to this problem as one which should be solved.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we would like to assure the Secretary-General that, in considering his budget estimates for 1959, we are fully aware of the tremendous responsibilities which events and decisions of various organs have placed upon him and the Secretariat as a whole. We are also fully aware of the very high level of performance which has been obtained in dealing with these responsibilities. We realize that the budget estimates represent the judgment of the Secretary-General as to the financial support which he believes will be required in carrying out his responsibilities. I am sure that he will understand that, wherever we may disagree with him concerning particular expenditures, it is only because we believe that we too have a responsibility to the organization which we must fulfill.

Human Rights and the Covenants

*Statement by Mrs. Oswald B. Lord
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

We have, in the past, stated our position on the [human rights] covenants and the reasons for our intention not to sign or ratify the covenants. We have felt that the covenants are not the means best suited to facilitate the promotion and preservation of human rights throughout the world. We do want to reiterate, however, that the United States Government wishes to encourage the promotion of human rights and individual freedoms everywhere, both at home and abroad. We in the United States have a profound interest in human rights and fundamental freedoms, as outlined in our own Bill of Rights. It has been the firm policy of our Government to support all efforts made to improve the lot of human beings the world over. Progress has been slow and often disheartening, but we are confident of ultimately achieving our goal.

The U.S. Government has firmly supported the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the General Assembly proclaimed 10 years ago. We support the efforts the United Nations has taken and will take to bring about the fulfillment of these principles in every part of the world. I am sure that we share with everyone

¹ Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on Oct. 10 (U.S. delegation press release 3015).

here genuine devotion to the cause of human rights throughout the world. We differ only as to method, feeling that more can be accomplished through persuasion and example rather than through what we deem to be the coercion inherent in the treaty approach.

This year we are joining with other nations of the world to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We are planning to organize programs in all our schools and churches and other institutions throughout America and, in this connection, to establish close liaison with nongovernmental organizations.

I hope, Madam Chairman, that we may have the opportunity, either at the special plenary or at some other time, to hear from other delegations as to their detailed plans for the observance in their own countries of this 10th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In closing may I say that it is our intention to consult with other delegations, to offer suggestions, and to participate in drafting the language of the draft covenants so as to produce the best possible formulation. We hope, Madam Chairman, that we can be constructive and helpful.

TREATY INFORMATION

Supplementary Income-Tax Protocol With U.K. Enters Into Force

Press release 619 dated October 16

On October 15, 1958, the supplementary income-tax protocol of August 19, 1957, between the United States and the United Kingdom was brought into force by the exchange of instruments of ratification at London.

The supplementary protocol amends the convention of April 16, 1945, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, as modified by supplementary protocols of June 6, 1946, and May 25, 1954.¹

The new supplementary protocol contains three articles. Article I amends article VIII of the 1945 convention relating to exemption from tax-

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1546 and 3165.

ation, on certain conditions, of royalties and other amounts paid as consideration for the use of, or for the privilege of using, copyrights, patents, designs, secret processes and formulas, trade marks, and other like property. Article II amends article XIII of the 1945 convention relating to credits against the tax paid to one country for tax paid to the other country. The combined effect of those amendments is to eliminate double taxation with respect to royalty payments received from a U.K. licensee by a U.S. licensor having a permanent establishment in the United Kingdom.

Article III provides for ratification and the exchange of instruments of ratification and specifies the dates on and after which the provisions shall be effective with respect to U.S. and British taxes. In the case of U.S. taxes the protocol is effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1956. In the case of U.K. taxes the protocol is effective (a) as respects income tax and surtax for any year of assessment beginning on or after April 6, 1956, and (b) as respects profits tax for any chargeable accounting period beginning on or after April 1, 1956, and for the unexpired portion of any chargeable accounting period current at that date.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Notification by United Kingdom of application to (with reservations): Aden, British Guiana, Seychelles, Cyprus, Gibraltar, British Honduras, and Uganda, August 27, 1958.

Cultural Property

Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.¹

Ratification deposited: Brazil, September 12, 1958. Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.¹

Ratification deposited: Brazil, September 12, 1958.

Whaling

Amendments to paragraphs 6 (1), 6 (2), 8 (a), and 8 (c) of the schedule to the international whaling convention of 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at the 10th meeting of the International Whaling Commission, The Hague, June 23-27, 1958. Entered into force October 6, 1958, with the exception of amendments to paragraph 8 (a) and (c).

¹ Not in force for the United States.

BILATERAL

Peru

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of April 9, 1958 (TIAS 4045). Effectuated by exchange of notes at Lima September 10 and 12, 1958. Entered into force September 12, 1958.

Spain

Agreement providing for the financing of certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Madrid October 16, 1958. Entered into force October 16, 1958.

Tunisia

Agreement regarding certain assurances by Tunisia supplementing the economic, technical and related assistance agreement of March 26, 1957 (TIAS 3974). Effectuated by exchange of notes at Tunis, October 8, 1958. Entered into force October 8, 1958.

Turkey

Agreement relating to the loan of vessels to Turkey. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Ankara October 14, 1958. Entered into force October 14, 1958.

United Kingdom

Supplementary protocol amending the income tax convention of April 16, 1945 (TIAS 1546) as modified by supplementary protocols of June 6, 1946 (TIAS 1546) and May 25, 1954 (TIAS 3165). Signed at Washington August 19, 1957.

Ratified by the President: August 22, 1958.

Ratifications exchanged: October 15, 1958.

Entered into force: October 15, 1958.

The Mutual Security Program. Pub. 6674. General Foreign Policy Series 130. 16 pp. Limited distribution.

An address given by J. H. Smith, Jr., Director, International Cooperation Administration, explaining the mutual security program and the role which the United States plays in it.

Economic Conference of the Organization of American States. Pub. 6679. International Organization and Conference Series II, American Republics 16. 79 pp. Limited distribution.

Report of the U.S. delegation to the Economic Conference of the Organization of American States held at Buenos Aires, Argentina, from August 15 to September 4, 1957, with related documents.

United Nations . . . Meeting Place of 81 Countries. Pub. 6695. International Organization and Conference Series III, 129. 12 pp. 10¢.

A folder describing the purpose, functions, and accomplishments of the U.N. and its agencies.

The Colombo Plan . . . What It Is . . . How It Works. Pub. 6700. Economic Cooperation Series 46. 11 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet outlining the purpose, function, and organization of the Colombo Plan and U.S. participation in this program.

The Communist Threat in the Taiwan Area. Pub. 6708. Far Eastern Series 76. 24 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet in which U.S. policy on the Taiwan situation is promulgated. It includes a statement by Secretary Dulles, a White House statement, the President's report to the American people, and a reprint of a letter from the President to Premier Khrushchev.

Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. TIAS 4044. 71 pp. 25¢.

Convention between the United States of America and Other Governments—Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958.

Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation Services in Iceland. TIAS 4048. 84 pp. 25¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Other Governments—Done at Geneva September 25, 1956. Entered into force June 6, 1958.

Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation Services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands. TIAS 4049. 105 pp. 45¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Other Governments—Done at Geneva September 25, 1956. Entered into force June 6, 1958.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Loan of Seaplane Tender. TIAS 4064. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Norway, relating to agreement of January 27, 1950, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Oslo April 17 and May 8, 1958. Entered into force May 8, 1958.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4075. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and France, amending agreement of December 27, 1957. Exchange of letters—Signed at Paris June 30, 1958. Entered into force June 30, 1958.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Willard C. Muller a. International Cooperation Administration representative in Somalia, effective August 19. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 609 dated October 13.)

Philander P. Claxton, Jr., as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations (Mutual Security Affairs), effective October 6.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Atomic Energy. Negotiations for the Suspension of Nuclear Weapons Tests (Eisenhower, texts of U.S. and Soviet notes, U.S. delegation)	723	United Kingdom. Supplementary Income-Tax Protocol With U.K. Enters Into Force	759
China.		United Nations.	
Chinese Communist Resumption of Firing in Taiwan Straits Area (Dulles)	722	Current U.N. Documents	755
Secretary Dulles Discusses U.S. Foreign Policy for British Television Broadcast (Dulles, Clark)	733	Human Rights and the Covenants (Lord)	758
United States and Republic of China Reaffirm Solidarity (Dulles, text of joint communique)	721	U.N. Committee Opens Debate on Disarmament (Barco, Lodge)	747
Communism. Secretary Dulles Discusses U.S. Foreign Policy for British Television Broadcast (Dulles, Clark)	733	The United Nations and National Security (Cargo)	725
Congress, The. Claxton designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations	760	United Nations Day, 1958 (Lodge)	727
Department and Foreign Service. Designations (Claxton, Muller)	760	U.S. Views on the U.N. Budget for 1959 (Hickenlooper)	755
Disarmament. U.N. Committee Opens Debate on Disarmament (Barco, Lodge)	747		
Economic Affairs.		Name Index	
Problems Affecting International Trade (Dillon)	742	Barco, James W	747
Secretary Dulles Discusses U.S. Foreign Policy for British Television Broadcast (Dulles, Clark)	733	Cargo, William I	725
Supplementary Income-Tax Protocol With U.K. Enters Into Force	759	Clark, William D	733
Hungary. Second Anniversary of Hungarian Revolt	739	Claxton, Philander P., Jr	760
International Information. U.S. Sends Radio and Television Specialists to U.S.S.R.	740	Dillon, Douglas	742
International Law. The Bases of Peace (Murphy)	740	Dulles, Secretary	721, 722, 733
International Organizations and Conferences. Problems Affecting International Trade (Dillon)	742	Eisenhower, President	723
Middle East. Secretary Dulles Discusses U.S. Foreign Policy for British Television Broadcast (Dulles, Clark)	733	Hickenlooper, Bourke B	755
Mutual Security. Muller designated ICA representative in Somalia	760	Lodge, Henry Cabot	727, 747
Presidential Documents. Negotiations for the Suspension of Nuclear Weapons Tests	723	Lord, Mrs. Oswald B	758
Publications. Recent Releases	760	Muller, Willard C	760
Science. U.S. Replies to Soviet Note on Balloons (text of U.S. note)	739	Murphy, Robert	740
Somalia. Muller designated ICA representative	760		
Treaty Information.			
Current Actions	759		
Supplementary Income-Tax Protocol With U.K. Enters Into Force	759		
U.S.S.R.			
Negotiations for the Suspension of Nuclear Weapons Tests (Eisenhower, texts of U.S. and Soviet notes, U.S. delegation)	723	No. Date Subject	
U.S. Replies to Soviet Note on Balloons (text of U.S. note)	739	629 10/20 Dulles: resumption of firing by Chinese Communists.	
U.S. Sends Radio and Television Specialists to U.S.S.R.	740	630 10/20 Note to U.S.S.R. on suspension of nuclear tests.	
		*631 10/20 Educational exchange (Guatemala).	
		†632 10/21 IJC executive meeting.	
		*633 10/22 Educational exchange (Brazil).	
		634 10/23 Communique on Dulles-Chiang talks.	
		635 10/23 Dulles: interview for British television broadcast.	
		636 10/23 Note to U.S.S.R. on balloons.	
		637 10/23 Delegation to U.S.S.R. on radio-television exchange.	
		638 10/23 Anniversary of Hungarian revolt.	
		*639 10/24 Educational exchange (Colombia).	
		*640 10/24 Hart designated deputy assistant secretary (biographic details).	
		641 10/24 Murphy: "The Bases of Peace."	
		*642 10/25 John Lodge: "Peace Is a Product of Strength."	
		643 10/25 U.S. delegation to conference on nuclear test suspension.	

**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: October 20-26**

Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Releases issued prior to October 20 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 619 of October 16 and 623 of October 17.

No.	Date	Subject
629	10/20	Dulles: resumption of firing by Chinese Communists.
630	10/20	Note to U.S.S.R. on suspension of nuclear tests.
*631	10/20	Educational exchange (Guatemala).
†632	10/21	IJC executive meeting.
*633	10/22	Educational exchange (Brazil).
634	10/23	Communique on Dulles-Chiang talks.
635	10/23	Dulles: interview for British television broadcast.
636	10/23	Note to U.S.S.R. on balloons.
637	10/23	Delegation to U.S.S.R. on radio-television exchange.
638	10/23	Anniversary of Hungarian revolt.
*639	10/24	Educational exchange (Colombia).
*640	10/24	Hart designated deputy assistant secretary (biographic details).
641	10/24	Murphy: "The Bases of Peace."
*642	10/25	John Lodge: "Peace Is a Product of Strength."
643	10/25	U.S. delegation to conference on nuclear test suspension.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

DSB-DEC
UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS
ATT STEVENS RICE
313 N FIRST ST
ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN



the
Department
of
State

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300
(GPO)

The COLOMBO PLAN What it is . . . How it works

The Colombo Plan is the name given to the cooperative effort which countries of South and Southeast Asia, helped by countries outside of the region, are making to develop their economies and raise the living standards of their people.

A recent Department of State pamphlet—in question and answer format—discusses the history, aims, operation, achievements, and effect of the Plan, and United States participation in it.

Publication 6700

15 cents

For your convenience, the Order Form is printed below:

ADDRESS ORDER FORM TO THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS,
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
REMITTANCES, PAYABLE TO THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS,
SHOULD ACCOMPANY ORDERS.

Order Form

To: Supt. of Documents
Govt. Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

Please send me - - - - - copies of The Colombo Plan, What it is . . .
How it works

Name: _____

Street Address: _____

City, Zone, and State: _____

Enclosed find:

\$ _____
(cash, check, or
money order).